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Abstract
In the last decade, scholars have studied cooperation in one-
shot anonymous interactions under a dual-process perspec-
tive to understand whether it is more likely to be the result
of decisions made relying on an intuitive process or whether
it requires deliberation. The Social Heuristic Hypothesis pre-
dicts that, in one-shot anonymous interactions, cooperation
is the result of an intuitive process. Although there is empir-
ical evidence in favor of this hypothesis, many experiments
failed to replicate such results. In this Dissertation, we try
to reconcile the mixed evidence by exploring additional as-
pects of the causal link between the modes of cognition and
cooperation, such as possible moderator factors, and by ex-
ploring the reliability of cognitive manipulations. In Chapter
1, we investigate the role of altruism and reciprocity in the
online one-shot Public Goods Game, both with and without
the cognitive manipulations. In Chapter 2, we explore the
role of social norms and altruism in the online one-shot Pub-
lic Goods Game under cognitive manipulations. In the last
Chapter, we develop an experimental design to validate the
treatments used to induce intuition and deliberation. As a
proxy of the effectiveness of the cognitive manipulations, we
use the Cognitive Reflection Test. This is a measure of the
ability of individuals to resist intuitive responses and to en-
gage in further reflection. In Chapter 1, we find that altruism
goes with larger contribution levels under both treatments;
reciprocity predicts contribution levels only under treatment
designed to foster deliberation. In Chapter 2, we find that
contributions and descriptive norms are higher whereas in-
junctive norms are more extreme under an experimental ma-
nipulation designed to foster deliberation. Finally, in the last
Chapter, we find that the treatment designed to foster delib-
eration increases the likelihood to provide correct answers,
while the treatment designed to foster intuition increases the




Cooperation is a situation where two or more individuals have to decide
whether to pay a cost to make another agent or the society as a whole
better off without an immediate benefit. Humans live and are organized
in large societies where cooperation is a crucial factor for their stabil-
ity. Understanding why some individuals cooperate and while others do
not, or why some individuals cooperate in some circumstances but do
not in others is still heavily debated (see Rand and Nowak, 2013, for a
review).
Cooperative behavior has been observed both in repeated situations
and in one-shot anonymous interactions. In the former, cooperation has
been explained by means of the five rules for the evolution of coopera-
tion by Nowak (2006). For example, an individual may use the tit-for-tat
strategy (Axelord, 1984) in repeated interactions: they start with coop-
eration, and they behave according to what the other has done in the
previous interaction, thus the individual will cooperate if the other co-
operates as well (Milinski, 1987). In in one-shot anonymous interactions,
the motives are not trivial and to explain them scholars have focused on
social preferences (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) and moral preferences (Aguiar, Branas-Garza, and L. M.
Miller, 2008; Capraro and Rand, 2018; Capraro and Perc, 2021). Another
approach that has emerged in the last decade is the study of the determi-
nants of cooperative behavior through a dual-process perspective. Dual-
Process theories posit that decisions result from the interplay between
two cognitive systems: System 1 and System 2. The former is fast, au-
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tomatic, and related to intuition, while the latter is slow, controlled, and
related to deliberation. Following the Dual-Process approach scholars
have tried to understand whether cooperative behavior in one-shot inter-
actions is the result of a default predisposition or whether such behavior
can be reached by exerting self-control to override selfishness, and thus
through more deliberation. Rand, Peysakhovich, et al. (2014) proposed a
theory that allows to provide an answer: the Social Heuristics Hypoth-
esis. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (that we are going to explain in
deeper detail in the next Section) predicts that intuition favors coopera-
tion, but the experimental evidence has shown mixed results which we
will review in the next Sections.
In this Dissertation, we combine tools from behavioral economics,
experimental economics and social psychology to investigate some po-
tential determinants of cooperation and how they interact with intuition
and deliberation. Before getting into the Dissertation core, we give an
overview of the main findings in this line of research. Section 1 briefly
introduces the Dual Process approach and a brief literature review of the
main findings. In Section 2, we introduce the determinants of coopera-
tive behavior. In Section 3, we outline the Dissertation and the contribu-
tion to the literature of each Chapter.
1 Cognition and Cooperation
Following the Dual Process theories, individuals’ decisions result from
the interplay of two cognitive systems. System 1 can be considered as
a rapid, effortless, and automatic process that produces default choices,
and it is related to intuition, while System 2 is slow, effortful, controlled,
and it leads to more reasoning (Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
Many experimental conditions have been designed to manipulate the
modes of cognition to increase the possibilities of observing responses
driven by System 1 or System 2. Some of these cognitive manipulations
are: time constraints, motivated delay, cognitive load, conceptual prim-
ing, ego depletion, and neurostimulation (they are reported in a nutshell
in Table 1). Notice that it has never been tested whether these treatments
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foster intuition and deliberation. Given that it would be noteworthy to
validate the effect of these treatments, we develop a new experimental
design aimed at studying whether they foster intuition and deliberation.
Scholars have focused their attention on whether cooperation in one-
shot anonymous interactions results from an intuitive process or whether
it requires deliberation, and this has led to a fruitful debate. Rand, J. D.
Greene, and Nowak (2012), in their seminal work, implemented an ex-
perimental design aimed at fostering intuition and deliberation. Individ-
uals had to decide how much to contribute to the Public Goods Game;
they were randomly divided into two treatments: time pressure and time
delay. In the time pressure condition they had to provide their contribu-
tion within a short amount of time. In the time delay condition they had
to provide their contribution after a given amount of time. The authors
found that cooperation is higher under intuition with respect to delibera-
tion. To explain these results, Rand, Peysakhovich, et al. (2014) presented
the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH). According to the SHH, humans
internalize those behaviors that are successful in their everyday life, and
they use them as default strategies in new environments. Since daily in-
teractions are often repeated, they may lead cooperation to evolve thanks
to the five rules of cooperation (Nowak, 2006), and therefore people can
internalize cooperation as a heuristic. Humans might use cooperation
as a default strategy in new interaction settings, e.g., the lab environ-
ment and when they are asked to make a decision in a short amount
of time. While, when individuals deliberate, they can calculate and un-
derstand that defection is the pay-off dominant strategy in the one-shot
interactions. The SHH thus predicts that intuition favors cooperation
in one-shot anonymous interactions. Moreover, the SHH has been ap-
plied for other prosocial behaviors such as altruism (Rand, 2016), hon-
esty (Capraro, 2017), and altruistic punishment (Hallsson, Siebner, and
Hulme, 2018). The predictions of the SHH were successfully tested by
several studies (Cone and Rand, 2014; Rand, Peysakhovich, et al., 2014;
Rand, Newman, and Wurzbacher, 2015; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2015;
Rand, 2016; Everett et al., 2017; Isler, Maule, and Starmer, 2018; Bird et
al., 2019). However, other studies failed in the attempt to replicate the
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SHH’s predictions (Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester,
2014; Stromland, Tjotta, and Torsvik, 2016; Bouwmeester et al., 2017), or
yet other studies even found that intuition favors selfishness (Capraro
and Cococcioni, 2016). In a meta-analysis with 67 studies Rand (2019)
found that overall intuition favors cooperation, but this finding is at odds
with a subsequent meta-analysis (87 studies) by Kvarven et al. (2020); for
a complete review refer to Capraro (2019). To conclude, there is mixed
evidence in the literature for what concerns the causal link between the
modes of cognition and cooperation.
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Table 1: Treatments designed to manipulate cognition
Manipulation System being Promoted Method
Time Constraint: Time Pressure Intuition Subjects are asked to answer within a short
amount of time (e.g., 5-10s)
Time Constraint: Time Delay Deliberation Subjects are asked to answer after a given
amount of time (e.g., 10s)
Motivated Delay Deliberation Subjects are asked to motivate their decisions
before making their actual choice
Cognitive Load: Working Memory Intuition Subjects are asked to solve an unrelated task,
before the main one, that uses the working
memory
Conceptual priming Intuition & Deliberation Subjects are asked to complete an exercise that
prime them to rely on intuition or deliberation
Ego depletion Intuition Subjects are asked to complete unrelated tasks
that deplete their self-control
Neurostimulation Intuition & Deliberation Activation or deactivation of brain areas using
electric or magnetic stimulation tools
Note: we present here some of the main cognitive manipulations that are currently used in the literature.
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2 The determinants of the cooperative behavior
Scholars have recently tried to reconcile the mixed evidence by taking
into account potential determinants of cooperation. Indeed humans are
heterogeneous, and such heterogeneity should be taken into account. To
reconcile this mixed evidence, scholars have started to study factors that
may act as potential moderators of the effect of cognition on coopera-
tion. Characteristics such as experience, trust, and social value orien-
tation (that is a proxy of altruism) may affect choices under cognitive
manipulations. Rand, Peysakhovich, et al. (2014) found that participants
who have no previous experience with experimental settings cooperate
more under treatments designed to foster intuition than those who have
experience. Rand and Kraft-Todd (2014) found that intuition increases
cooperation among those who are inexperienced and trust other people.
Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani (2020) found that subjects with higher (lower)
social value orientation tend to cooperate more (less) in both treatments,
but the effect is stronger for more altruist (selfish) individuals under time
pressure with respect to time delay.
In this Dissertation, we are going to investigate the role of some of
the potential moderators of the effect of cognition on cooperation, and
specifically we focus on altruism, reciprocity, and social norms.
An individual is considered an altruist if she is willing to pay a per-
sonal cost to increase the pay-off of another individual. Altruism is con-
sidered as a behavior of unconditional kindness (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006;
Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni and J. Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002).
This disposition has been widely used in economics to explain the char-
itable and voluntary behavior (Andreoni and Payne, 2013; List, 2011).
Specifically social value orientation (Murphy, Ackermann, and Hand-
graaf, 2011) has been used to capture this disposition. It seems notewor-
thy to study whether altruism might mediate the role of the cognitive
manipulations on cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions. In-
deed, there is evidence that individuals do not care only about their own
pay-off (self-regarding preferences), but they also care about others’ pay-off
(other-regarding preferences), and such preferences might be at work when
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individuals make decisions in one-shot anonymous interactions under
the cognitive manipulations. Specifically, individuals might be more al-
truistic when intuition is fostered because they do not have time to un-
derstand what is the decision that leads them to the highest pay-off.
Reciprocity embodies the idea that an individual will cooperate if and
only if she believes the others will cooperate as well (Fehr and Schmidt,
2006; Rabin, 1993; Segal and Sobel, 2007; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr,
2001; Kurzban and Houser, 2005; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Boosey,
2017; T. O. Weber, Weisel, and Gächter, 2018). A key aspect of reciprocity
is the belief about others’ likelihood to cooperate, but individuals are het-
erogeneous both in their disposition to reciprocate (Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr, 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Fischbacher, Gächter, and
Quercia, 2012) as well as in their expectation about others’ level of co-
operation (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia, 2012). Reciprocity and the
formation of beliefs about others’ behavior are experienced daily by indi-
viduals, and thus it would be of interest to understand whether and how
they impact cooperation under cognitive manipulations. The disposition
to reciprocate might have a greater role when deliberation is prompted
because individuals have time to form beliefs about others’ behavior.
Social norms are classified as descriptive and injunctive norms. The
former embodies the idea that individuals tend to behave according to
what they believe other people will do. The latter embodies the idea that
individuals tend to behave according to what they believe other people
would approve or disapprove of. It is important to notice that descriptive
norms differ from reciprocity. In fact, the first leads individuals to follow
and conform to the average behavior of the peers and the context (Mul-
doon et al., 2014), while reciprocity is the disposition to cooperate condi-
tionally on expected cooperation by others. It has been shown that indi-
viduals tend to follow what they think are the norms in a given context
(Schwartz, 1977; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren, 1990; Bicchieri and Xiao,
2009). Moreover, Capraro, Jagfeld, et al. (2019) have shown that nudging
the injunctive norms increases cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Injunctive norms might be at stake when individuals have to make a
choice when Systems 2 is fostered, because individuals might rationalize
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what the others would approve. Similarly descriptive norms might be at
stake when Systems 2 is fostered, because individuals might need time
to form expectations about others’ behavior.
3 Dissertation outline
In the first Part of the Dissertation, we study the effect of possible factors
on the role of cognition on cooperation, i.e., altruism, reciprocity and so-
cial norms. In the second Part, we provide a useful tool to experimenters
that are interested in cognition. Specifically, we try to validate the Time
Delay and Time Pressure treatments by means of the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test (Frederick, 2005).
We contribute to the literature on cognition and cooperation mainly
by:
(i) Trying to reconcile the mixed evidence in the literature (Chapter 1
- Chapter 2).
(ii) Exploring the role of potential moderators of the effect of cognition
on cooperative behavior (Chapter 1 - Chapter 2).
(iii) Proposing a novel experimental design aimed at validating the
treatments designed to foster intuition and deliberation (Chapter
3).
Below we present the research questions of each Chapter, and the main
results.
In the first Chapter, we explore the role of social value orientation
and reciprocity in online setting, and their dependency on the modes of
cognition, using a strategic game (the Public Goods Game) to detect the
level of cooperation:
RQ1: What is the role of altruism and reciprocity in deter-
mining the level of cooperation in a Public Goods Game, and
how they moderate the effect of the cognition?
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Our contribution to the literature provides experimental evidence sug-
gesting that in the online one-shot Public Goods Game, altruism pos-
itively affects contribution levels, irrespective of the cognitive modes,
and reciprocity predicts contribution levels only when deliberation is fos-
tered.
In the second Chapter, we explore the role of social value orienta-
tion and social norms in the online setting, and their dependency on the
modes of cognition, using a strategic game (the Public Goods Game) to
detect the level of cooperation:
RQ2: What is the role of altruism and social norms in de-
termining the level of cooperation in a Public Goods Game,
and how they moderate the effect of cognition?
Results show that contributions to the Public Goods Game are higher un-
der deliberation with respect to intuition; moreover we find that descrip-
tive norms and injunctive norms are endogenous. Indeed descriptive
norms are higher for those participants that are under deliberation, and
injunctive norms are more extreme for those participants who are un-
der deliberation. Results suggest that the modes of cognition affect the
contributions to the Public Goods Game and the relevant social norms.
In the last Chapter, we study whether treatments designed to manip-
ulate cognition actually induce greater reliance on intuition and delib-
eration. Specifically, we focus on time manipulations where the exper-
imenter manipulates the response time available to the subjects: Time
Pressure and Time Delay treatments (see Table 1). As a proxy of the ef-
fectiveness of the cognitive manipulations, we use the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test (CRT) by Frederick (2005) in the version of Primi et al. (2016)
(CRT-L). The CRT indeed is a proxy of a person’s ability to resist intu-
itive responses, and to engage in further reflection to reach the correct
responses. CRT allows for correct answers, and two types of incorrect
answers: intuitive but incorrect answers and non-intuitive incorrect an-
swers that include all the other possible answers. Our research question
is:
RQ3: Are time manipulations effective in fostering reliance
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on intuition and deliberation?
Our contribution to the literature provides experimental evidence that
Time Delay increases the likelihood to provide correct answers, and thus
it leads to more deliberation. On the other side, Time Pressure increases
the likelihood to provide non-intuitive incorrect answers. Notice that we
cannot easily conclude the CRT does not induce intuition. Indeed there is
evidence that CRT does not capture intuitive predisposition (Pennycook
et al., 2016), and therefore further research should be conducted.
All the studies have been run in online settings, and we think this is
an important additional aspect because this has allowed us to collect a
non-standard pool, to reach a wide, heterogeneous and more representa-
tive sample, and to easily randomize individuals in different conditions.
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Table 2: Dissertation outline
Chapter Research Question Method Results
Introduction
Chapter 1 What is the role of altruism and
reciprocity in determining the
level of cooperation in a Public
Goods Game and how they




Game under two treatments
designed to manipulate
cognition
Contributions to PGG are not different in the
two treatments. Altruism goes with larger
contribution levels under both treatments, while
reciprocity predicts contribution levels only
under the treatment designed to foster
deliberation
Chapter 2 What is the role of altruism and
social norms in determining the
level of cooperation in a Public
Goods Game, and how they




Game under two treatments
designed to manipulate
cognition
Contributions to PGG and descriptive norms
are higher under treatment designed to foster
deliberation, and injunctive norms are more
extreme under the treatment designed to foster
deliberation
Chapter 3 Are time manipulations
effective in fostering reliance on
intuition and deliberation?
Subjects have to answer the
Cognitive Reflection Test in
an online setting under the
cognitive manipulations
based on time constraints
Time Delay increases the likelihood to provide
correct answers online, while Time Pressure
increases the likelihood to provide






It is still a matter of investigation why some individuals cooperate, espe-
cially when we consider one-shot anonymous interactions. Individuals
are heterogeneous, and identifying which are the factors that may act as
potential moderators of the effect of cognition on cooperation is relevant.
In this Chapter, we explore two possible determinants of cooperation
that are altruism and reciprocity. Moreover, we study their dependency
on the modes of cognition. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
who address this issue by taking into account their joint role. Moreover,
we do it through an online experiment that allows us to collect a non-
standard pool and reach a wide and heterogeneous sample.
Reciprocity embodies the idea that one’s decision to cooperate is con-
ditional on expected cooperation by others. Available experimental ev-
idence on cooperation in social dilemmas suggests that individuals re-
spond to expected behavior with like behavior (Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr, 2001; Kurzban and Houser, 2005; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006;
Boosey, 2017; T. O. Weber, Weisel, and Gächter, 2018), possibly form-
ing expectations on observed past behavior (Brañas-Garza and Espinosa,
2011). In particular, models of reciprocity postulate that the belief about
This Chapter is based on Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Celadin (2020).
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others’ likelihood to cooperate is the key determinant of the extent of
one’s willingness to cooperate. Also, it has been observed that individu-
als are typically heterogeneous in both their disposition to be conditional
cooperators (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001), and their belief about
others’ likelihood to cooperate (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia, 2012).
Altruism embodies the idea that the decision to cooperate is uncon-
ditional on expected cooperation by others. The Social Value Orienta-
tion (SVO) consists of a series of points allocation tasks that are a variant
of the dictator game. SVO is often used as a measure of altruism (Van
Lange et al., 1997; Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf, 2011; Murphy
and Ackermann, 2014; Dolton, Tol, et al., 2019). Available experimental
evidence suggests that SVO provides information on the extent to which
an individual is cooperative (Pletzer et al., 2018; Bogaert, Boone, and De-
clerck, 2008; Balliet, Parks, and Joireman, 2009; Emonds et al., 2014; Kuss
et al., 2015; Bieleke et al., 2017; Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani, 2020).
Although many studies have investigated the role of either altruism
or reciprocity, most have considered them separately. An important ex-
ception is the approach proposed by Kurzban and Houser (2005) to clas-
sify altruists (unconditional cooperators) and reciprocators (conditional
cooperators) using actual cooperative behavior in a social dilemma.
Kurzban and Houser (2005) provide experimental evidence of a substan-
tial role of both conditional and unconditional cooperators. This classi-
fication, which aims to identify a stable set of behavioral types, implies
that reciprocal and altruistic behaviors are mutually exclusive. Here in-
stead, we try to consider their joint role for explaining cooperation in
a social dilemma. For this reason, we use one source of information for
measuring altruism (SVO) and another source of information for measur-
ing the disposition to conditionally cooperate (referred to as dCC here-
after), both distinct from actual behavior in the social dilemma.
To the best of our knowledge, only Ackermann and Murphy (2019)
have tried so far to shed light on the joint role of the disposition to do-
nate, and the disposition to reciprocate, and they do so in a laboratory
setting. Their findings point to the fact that SVO and dCC can be two
separable predictors of cooperation in the Public Goods Game (PGG),
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but their interplay with cognition is not explored.
In this Chapter, we report two studies, implemented using the soft-
ware oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens, 2016), based on incentivized
online experiments where individuals play a one-shot anonymous PGG.
The PGG is widely used to measure cooperation (Bogaert, Boone, and
Declerck, 2008; Dolton, Tol, et al., 2019; Kocher et al., 2017; Vives and
FeldmanHall, 2018) with the one-shot anonymous version allowing to
minimize strategic considerations. The existing literature studying be-
havior in the one-shot PGG has focused on the following determinant
of contributions: internal and external returns to contributions (Goeree,
Holt, and Laury, 2002), rewards and sanctions (Walker and Halloran,
2004), reciprocity (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), public disclosure of
contributions (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2014), group size (Barcelo and
Capraro, 2015), and social uncertainty and SVO (Alós-Ferrer and Garag-
nani, 2020). We differentiate from these by jointly considering SVO and
reciprocity.
The first study measures dCC, beliefs about others’ contributions and
SVO, to see whether dCC and SVO are distinct sources of explanation
for the contributions to the one-shot PGG. We found that a higher level
of SVO predicts a greater contribution in the PGG, in line with the re-
sults of Balliet, Parks, and Joireman (2009), while dCC seems not to
play a substantial role. This latter finding suggests a reduced role for
reciprocity with respect to previous findings obtained in laboratory ex-
periments on PGGs, which measure conditional cooperation using the
method of Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) or some related algo-
rithm (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia, 2012; T. O. Weber, Weisel, and
Gächter, 2018; Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy, 2018). Actually, our find-
ing is not directly comparable with the previous ones because we adopt a
different specification that allows the inclusion of SVO. To the best of our
knowledge, the only study in this literature which employs a regression
specification similar to ours is Gächter, Kölle, and Quercia (2017), where
dCC is found to have a substantial role.
In a second study, we want to understand whether altruism and reci-
procity are potential moderators of the role of cognition on cooperation,
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indeed we ran another online experiment, almost identical to the one in
the first study, where the only difference is that we manipulated cogni-
tion by means of two conditions: a time pressure treatment (TP) to induce
less deliberative decisions (following Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani, 2020),
and a motivated delay treatment (MD) to induce more deliberative de-
cisions (following Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Luini, 2020). We found that
the role of SVO is, as in the first study, basically unaffected by the TP
and MD treatments, while dCC predicts a greater level of contribution in
the PGG but only under the MD treatment. The lack of treatment effects
on the role of SVO roughly replicates, in an online setting, the finding
in Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani (2020) for the one-shot PGG. The presence
of treatment effects on the role of dCC has instead no terms of compar-
ison in the literature, but it may actually help reconciling the apparent
contrast with previous results found in the first study: dCC has the po-
tential to account for contributions but, in order to do so, it requires that
participants exert a sufficient degree of cognitive effort, which seems to
be often the case in laboratory experiments and it might not be the case
in online experiments; in the latter case, the MD treatment may allow
raising the cognitive effort enough to make dCC capable of explaining
contributions.
In sum, our addition to the literature is the provision of experimental
evidence suggesting that in the online one-shot PGG: (i) a higher SVO
score goes with higher contribution levels, irrespective of the manipu-
lation of the extent of deliberation; (ii) measures of reciprocity obtained
with the strategy method predict contribution levels only when deliber-
ation is prompted.
The Chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the first study,
Section 2 presents the second study, and Section 3 discusses the results.
Supplementary information on collected data, experimental instructions,




In the first online experiment, we study how individual measures of SVO
and dCC predict contributions in an online one-shot PGG, taking into
account beliefs about others’ contributions.
The SVO (Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf, 2011) is an incen-
tivized continuous measure that captures individuals’ altruism. It con-
sists of a series of points allocation tasks that are a variant of the dictator
game (Forsythe et al., 1994), that captures how much an agent is willing
to renounce to make another agent better off (or worse off).1 Each indi-
vidual gets a score that is an angle between -16.26 and 61.39, resulting
from the choices in the allocation tasks. An angle between -12.04 and
22.45 is defined as individualistic predisposition; in particular, an angle
of 0 is interpreted as caring for own pay-off only. An angle between 22.45
and 57.15 is defined as prosocial predisposition; in particular, an angle of
45 gives equal weights to own and others’ pay-off. An angle below -12.04
is defined as competitive predisposition. Finally, an angle above 57.15 is
defined as purely altruistic predisposition.
Our measure of dCC is binary, and captures the willingness to co-
operate conditionally on the belief that an individual has about others’
contributions. Specifically, an individual classified as dCC has a predis-
position to contribute, which on average, grows in her expectation about
others’ contributions (as in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia, 2012). To
elicit dCC we use a variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967; Fis-
chbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001). Given our focus on reciprocity, and
not on an exhaustive classification of behavioral types, we group to-
gether all individuals who are not dCC and we refer to them as nCC.
More articulated classifications have been used in the literature, distin-
guishing among free riders, hump shaped and unconditional coopera-
tors (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001; Thöni and Volk, 2018). We
report in Supplementary Material for Chapter 1 the analysis employing
such finer classifications as a robustness check of our results.
1See (Engel, 2011) for a meta-study on dictator game experiments.
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1.1 Method
We recruited 120 participants using the online platform Prolific2. Our
participants were mainly from UK and US (UK=73.3%, US=17.5% mean
age=30.02, males=37.5%, females=62.5%).
The experiment took place online on April 1, 2019. Participants were
randomly assigned to groups of four individuals to play a one-shot
anonymous PGG. Each participant was endowed with 20 points, and
they had to decide how many points to contribute to a common pool.
The sum of contributions to the common pool was then doubled and
redistributed evenly among the group members. No feedback was pro-
vided.
After the one-shot PGG, we elicited an incentivized measure of par-
ticipants’ beliefs about the average contribution of the other three group
members. Participants obtained a bonus of 10 points if they guessed cor-
rectly the average level of contribution (rounded to the closest integer)
by the other group members. Subsequently, we elicited, using the strat-
egy method, an incentivized measure of the disposition to conditionally
cooperate: participants had to indicate how much they wanted to con-
tribute to the public good conditionally on different (integer) values of
average contribution by the other group members. More precisely, par-
ticipants had to choose a contribution level for 21 different values of the
average contribution by the other group members (from 0 to 20). We in-
centivized the strategy method following Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr
(2001): for each group, a member was randomly selected and her pay-
off calculated using the choice she made under the strategy method for
the average contribution value that matched the actual one in her group
(rounded to the closest integer), whereas for the other three group mem-
bers the pay-off was computed according to the decisions made in the
one-shot PGG. This method allows to assess how individuals would like
to condition their decision on the behavior of the other group members
(in Supplementary Material for Chapter 1, we report the maps of condi-
tional cooperation strategies at the individual level obtained from actual
2www.prolific.co; Palan and Schitter, 2018
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choices). Individuals are classified as dCC either if they show a mono-
tonic pattern of contributions, with at least one increase, or if they have
a positive Spearman rank correlation that is significant at the 1%-level
(see Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia, 2012, for the details of this defi-
nition); otherwise, individuals are classified as non-conditional coopera-
tors (nCC). In the literature, the belief elicitation comes after the Strategy
Method elicitation (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Quercia, 2012; T. O. Weber, Weisel, and Gächter, 2018); we opted to
ask for beliefs about others’ behavior before the Strategy Method in or-
der to avoid potential confounding effects due to the Strategy Method.
In this part of the experiment 10 points corresponded to 0.10 GBP.
Subsequently, we elicited an incentivized measure of SVO using the
task in the version of the six primary items by Murphy, Ackermann, and
Handgraaf (2011). Participants were randomly assigned to interact with
a new participant (different from those with whom they were playing
the PGG). All the participants completed the SVO task. Payments were
determined by randomly assigning participants to the role of decision-
maker or receiver, and one of the decision-maker’s choices was randomly
selected to determine the pay-offs of both participants involved. In this
part of the experiment 10 points corresponded to 0.05 GBP.
We opted to pay for all tasks, in particular both the one-shot PGG and
the belief elicitation. Admittedly, this increases the room for potential bi-
ases due to hedging motives. However, as pointed out by Blanco et al.
(2010), in order for such biases to be a major issue the hedging problem
should be fairly transparent and the gains from hedging substantial. In
our setup it is quite difficult to figure out what is the guess that opti-
mally insures against the risk of low contributions by others and, more-
over, the payment for a correct guess is rather small. Randomizing pay-
ments across tasks would have helped in reducing hedging motives, but
it could have also generated some confusion about the payment mech-
anism, especially in the online setting where participants tend to spend
little time on screens and they cannot ask for clarifications during the
experiment.
The average earnings in this study were 1.38 GPB including 0.40 GPB
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of show-up fee (which translates into an average hourly wage of 10.91
GBP).
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Linear prediction of the level of contribution in the PGG as
a function of SVO. (b) Linear prediction of the level of contribution in the
PGG as a function of the individual belief about others’ average contribu-
tion, distinguishing between participants classified as conditional coopera-
tors (dCC) and non-conditional cooperators (nCC). Scatter plots identify the
relative frequencies of the observations in the sample. Confidence intervals
are at 95%.
1.2 Results
Our analysis focuses on how much SVO and dCC can account for actual
contributions in the one-shot PGG.
In Table 3, we report the fraction of participants that we classified
as dCC and nCC, together with the fractions for the finer classifications
by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and Thöni and Volk (2018) (see
Supplementary Material for Chapter 1 for details on the classification
rules). Notably, slightly less than two-thirds of participants are classified
as dCC. Overall, our coarser classification does not depart very much
from the one obtained following Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001)
(only about 6% of participants are not classified as either dCC or Other),
while the difference with the classification obtained following Thöni and
Volk (2018) is more pronounced (about 21% of participants are not clas-
sified as either dCC or Other).
In Figure 1a contributions are plotted against the SVO score, which
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Classification Fischbacher et al., 2001 Thöni and Volk, 2018 Our Contribution
Conditional Cooperators 63.33% 62.50% 63.33%
Free Riders 0.83% 0.83% –
Hump Shaped 5% 7.50% –
Unconditional Cooperators – 12.50% –
Other 30.83% 16.67% 36.67%
Table 3: Classification of behavioral types in Study 1 following Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr (2001), Thöni and Volk (2018), and our classification.
turns out to be a good predictor: participants with a higher SVO score
contributed more to the PGG. This finding is confirmed by the Tobit re-
gression reported in Table 4 (Model 1); the result holds even when con-
trols for gender, familiarity with the task, and comprehension of the task
are included as regressors (Model 2), suggesting that SVO positively af-
fects contributions to the PGG.
To investigate the role of the disposition to conditionally cooperate,
we look at how being classified as dCC, as opposed to nCC, affects the
relation between beliefs and contributions (Figure 1b). Comparing the re-
lation in the two cases, we see that beliefs seem to matter in the same way
for participants classified as dCC and participants classified as nCC. This
insight is confirmed by the Tobit regressions reported in Table 4 (Models
3 and 4), even when we examine the impact of SVO and dCC simulta-
neously (Models 5 and 6). Such evidence may be reconciled with the
estimates provided by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia (2012, Table 4)
by considering the fact that applying their finer classification of types we
have only less than 1% of Free Riders (Table 3), who are the only types
for which beliefs seem to matter substantially less.
For completeness and as robustness checks for our results, in Supple-
mentary Material for Chapter 1, we report alternative regressions using
the finer classification of types applied in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr
(2001) and the one in Thöni and Volk (2018). We find that results obtained
under these alternative specifications are very similar to those presented
here.
In sum, our results confirm that a higher SVO predicts higher con-
tributions. Instead, being a dCC seems not to predict contributions and
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be more reactive to beliefs about others’ contributions. However, be-
liefs seem to matter per se. This fact is not straightforward to interpret.
For instance, it could be because of the “false consensus effect” (Ross, D.
Greene, and House, 1977), or it could be because other kinds of other-
regarding preferences matter (we refer the reader to the discussion in
Section 3 on this point).
To investigate a possible explanation of our results we conducted
a second study where we attempt to manipulate the cognitive modes
of participants playing the PGG, following the idea that SVO and dCC
might play a different role under different cognitive modes.
Perc. Contribution Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
SVO 1.11∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.24) (0.25)
Belief 1.45∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.29) (0.32) (0.31)
dCC 4.59 6.13 -3.13 -1.55
(23.64) (23.50) (24.74) (24.82)
Belief×dCC 0.21 0.18 0.30 0.27
(0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
Controls:
Familiarity -4.15 1.67 -0.73
(11.50) (9.47) (9.39)
Gender 3.61 6.99 7.49
(11.43) (9.23) (9.00)
Understood -20.14∗ -13.14 -13.35
(11.58) (9.19) (8.96)
N 120 120 120 120 120 120
pseudo R2 0.015 0.020 0.085 0.088 0.089 0.093
Table 4: Tobit regressions on the level of endowment contributed in the one-
shot PGG. SVO is individuals’ social value orientation; Belief is the individ-
uals’ belief about others’ contributions; dCC=1 if an individuals is consid-
ered as a conditional cooperator, 0 otherwise; dCC×Belief is the interaction
between being and conditional cooperator and the level of belief about oth-
ers’ contributions; Gender=1 if female, 0 otherwise (1=24,17%); Familiarity
= 1 if individuals have seen “nothing like this scenario” before, 2 if they
have seen “somewhat this scenario” and 3 if they have seen “exactly this
scenario” (1=65%, 2=35%); Understood=1 if individuals answered correctly
to all the control questions, 0 otherwise (1=24.17%). Robust standard errors




This second study is similar to Study 1 with the only difference that we
randomly assign experimental subjects to two distinct treatments: a time
pressure treatment (TP) and a motivated delay treatment (MD). We aim
to see if the treatments alter how SVO and dCC predict contributions in
the one-shot PGG under the two cognitive manipulations. As in Study
1, we do so by contrasting dCC with nCC (see Supplementary Material
for Chapter 1 for an analysis with finer classifications according to Fis-
chbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001, and Thöni and Volk, 2018).
2.1 Method
In this second experiment we recruited 248 participants using the online
platform Prolific (www.prolific.co). Our participants are mainly from
UK and US (UK=84.68%, US=10.08% mean age=29.74, males=38.31%, fe-
males=61.69%).
The experiment took place online on May 6, 2019. Individuals were
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, 128 participants to the
TP treatment and 120 participants to the MD treatment. In the TP treat-
ment material incentives were provided to answer in a short amount
of time. Specifically, we applied costly waiting as introduced by Alós-
Ferrer and Garagnani (2020): participants were endowed with 15 addi-
tional points and 1.5 points were detracted from this amount for each
second taken by the subject to make the decision. After 10 seconds par-
ticipants could still make their decisions, though they earned no bonus in
this case. In the MD treatment, following Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Luini
(2020), participants had to write a motivation for their level of contribu-
tion before they actually inserted how much they wanted to contribute;
they were rewarded with 5 additional points if they gave a meaningful
motivation of at least 40 characters.3
3In order to minimize potential demand effects, in the instructions – rather than asking
for a meaningful motivation, which could in principle generate the expectation of a high
contribution – we exemplify what we mean by non-meaningful as follows: “If you give
a non-meaningful motivation (e.g., “aaaaaaaaa...”) you will not obtain the bonus” (see
Supplementary Material for Chapter 1, Screenshots of Study 2).
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The average earnings in this study were 1.46 GPB including 0.40 GPB




Figure 2: (a) Mean of the level of contribution between treatments in the
PGG. Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N=248, z=0.977, p=0.329. Epps-Singleton
test, N=248, W2=4.083, p=0.395. (b) Linear prediction of the level of contri-
bution in the PGG as a function of SVO in both treatments. (c) Linear predic-
tion of the level of contribution in the PGG as a function of the individual be-
lief about others’ average contribution, distinguishing between participants
classified as conditional cooperators (dCC) and non-conditional cooperators
(nCC), under the Time Pressure treatment (TP). (d) Linear prediction of the
level of contribution in the PGG as a function of the individual belief about
others’ average contribution, distinguishing between participants classified
as conditional cooperators (dCC) and non-conditional cooperators (nCC),
under the Motivated Delay treatment (MD). Scatter plots identify the rela-




In the TP treatment 88.28% of the participants (113 out of 128) complied
with the time incentive structure (compliance means that the response
time did not exceed the threshold after which zero extra points are ob-
tained). In the MD treatment, all participants complied with the request
to provide a meaningful motivation for their choice. We included all par-
ticipants in the analysis (results are robust even excluding participants
that did not comply with the time manipulations). In Table 5, we report
the fraction of participants that we classified as dCC and nCC in each
treatment, together with the fractions for the finer classifications by Fis-
chbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and Thöni and Volk (2018) (see Sup-
plementary Material for Chapter 1 for details on the classification rules).
As in Study 1, slightly less than two-thirds of participants are classified
as dCC. Overall, our coarser classification is close to the one obtained
following Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) (only about 10% of par-
ticipants are not classified as either dCC or Other), while the difference
with the classification obtained following Thöni and Volk (2018) is more
substantial (about 25% of participants are not classified as either dCC or
Other).
Fischbacher et al., 2001 Thöni and Volk, 2018 Our Contribution
TP MD TP MD TP MD
Conditional Cooperators 64.84% 60% 64.06% 60% 64.84% 60%
Free Riders 3.13% 0.83% 3.13% 0.83% – –
Hump Shaped 4.69% 8.33% 4.69% 11.67% – –
Unconditional Cooperators – – 14.06% 15.83% – –
Others 27.34% 30.83% 14.06% 11.67% 35.16% 40%
Table 5: Classification of behavioral types in Study 2 following Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr (2001), Thöni and Volk (2018), and our classification, for
each treatment. For each of these classifications we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the distribution of types is equal in the TP and MD treat-
ments (p-values for the Fischer’s exact test are, p = 0.354, p = 0.219, and
p = 0.256, respectively).
Figure 2a shows that both the average level of contributions that
are not statistically different in the two treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, N=248, z=0.977, P=0.329; Epps-Singleton test, N=248, W2=4.083,
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P=0.395). A Tobit regression (see Table 6, Model 1) confirms that the
cognitive manipulations had no significant effect, and this holds even
when controls for gender, familiarity with the task, and comprehension
of the task are included as regressors (see Table 6, Model 2). The lack of
any clear effect of the treatments on cooperative behavior can be placed
into a lively debate which is still to be settled (see the meta-analyses in
Rand, 2016, Bouwmeester et al., 2017 and Kvarven et al., 2020, and also
Capraro, 2019, for a recent review).
In Figure 2b contributions are plotted against the SVO score. As
in Study 1, a higher SVO goes with higher contributions, on average.
Specifically, this happens in both treatments with no substantial differ-
ence. These findings are confirmed by a Tobit regression (see Table 6,
Model 3), also controlling for gender, familiarity with the task, and com-
prehension of the task (Table 6, Model 4). Model 5 in Table 6 shows that
the interaction between SVO and MD is not significant. Overall the es-
timated coefficients for SVO are consistent across our two studies and
substantially in line with those obtained by Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani,
2020.
Figure 2c shows that in the TP treatment the relationship between
one’s belief about others’ contributions and one’s contribution does not
depend much on being classified as dCC or nCC, similarly to what we
found in Study 1. In particular, higher beliefs go with higher contribu-
tions. Figure 2d shows that in the MD treatment the average relationship
between beliefs and contributions depends on whether the participant is
classified as dCC or nCC. In particular, the fitted line for dCCs is much
steeper than the fitted line for nCCs, indicating that for dCCs beliefs may
be better predictors of contributions than for nCCs. The Tobit regres-
sions in Table 6 confirm these results (Models 3 and 4) and, moreover,
show that the distinction between dCC and nCC plays a role only when
participants are in the MD treatment (Models 5 and 6). Notice that, as
in Study 1, beliefs seem to matter per se, which remains a fact that is not
straightforward to explain (a more detailed discussion on this point can
be found in the following Section 3).
Finally, as done for Study 1, in Supplementary Material for Chapter
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Perc. Predicted Contribution Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MD 8.55 10.32 11.87 13.31∗ 83.52 82.19∗
(9.86) (9.80) (7.73) (7.52) (50.87) (49.20)
SVO 0.71∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Belief 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.31)
dCC -26.63 -22.48 -9.69 -4.70
(19.63) (19.62) (25.89) (26.86)
Belief×dCC 0.84∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.35 0.32










Familiarity -9.14 -0.87 -0.26
(9.935) (8.05) (7.84)
Understood -10.25 -12.18 -11.89
(12.31) (10.87) (10.30)
Gender 2.16 0.05 2.00
(10.28) (8.46) (8.45)
Constant 104.1∗∗∗ 126.3∗∗∗ -13.47 -9.742 -36.47 -34.41
(7.525) (26.09) (22.48) (29.66) (23.81) (32.70)
N 248 248 248 248 248 248
pseudo R2 0.001 0.002 0.066 0.068 0.074 0.075
Table 6: Tobit regressions on the level of endowment contributed in the
one-shot PGG. MD=1 if individuals are under the motivated delay condi-
tion, 0 otherwise; SVO is the individuals’ social value orientation; Belief is
the individuals’ belief about others’ contributions; dCC=1 if an individu-
als is considered as a conditional cooperator, 0 otherwise; dCC×Belief is the
interaction between being and conditional cooperator and the belief about
others’ behavior. Gender=1 if female, 0 otherwise (1=61,69%); Familiarity =
1 if individuals have seen “nothing like this scenario” before, 2 if they have
seen “somewhat this scenario” and 3 if they have seen “exactly this sce-
nario” (1=55.65%, 2=43.15%, 3=1.2%); Understood=1 if individuals answered
correctly to all the control questions, 0 otherwise (1=21.77%). Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05,
*** denotes p < 0.01.
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1 we report alternative regressions analysis using the finer classification
of types applied in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and the one in
Thöni and Volk (2018). Again, we find that results obtained under these
alternative specifications are very similar to those presented here.
3 Discussion
We have run two experiments to explore how altruism and reciprocity
affect contributions in an online one-shot PGG, trying to understand if
they might act as potential moderators of the effect of cognition on co-
operation. Specifically, the experimental evidence that we collected sug-
gests that both the disposition to donate and the disposition to recipro-
cate are sources of explanation of contributions, but while the disposition
to donate accounts for contributions regardless of our cognitive manip-
ulations, the disposition to reciprocate does so only when we prompt
deliberation by requesting to wait and write a motivation for the deci-
sion.
In more detail, in our first experiment there was no cognitive ma-
nipulation, while in the second experiment cognition was manipulated
by means of a time pressure treatment and a motivated delay treatment.
Comparing the data of the two experiments we found that in the time
pressure condition participants roughly behaved as in the first experi-
ment. If one assumes that deliberation has been more likely in the mo-
tivated delay treatment than in the time pressure treatment, then our
results can be interpreted as suggesting that in the online setting exper-
imental subjects are less prone to deliberation and thus behave more in-
tuitively.
At any rate, it is natural to ask why the disposition to reciprocate
should have a greater role under deliberation. One possibility is that
conditional cooperation requires to mentalize others’ behavior, and that
this, in turn, requires a greater understanding of the strategic situation
and, therefore, greater reflection (Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2020; Bi-
lancini, Boncinelli, and Mattiassi, 2019; Zonca, Coricelli, and Polonio,
2020). This argument definitely deserves attention, but it is not the only
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possible explanation of our findings. Another explanation has to do with
the way in which the disposition to reciprocate is measured: the use of
the strategy method to elicit reciprocal behavior is structurally prone to
deliberation as it requires participants to consider several different hy-
pothetical situations and choose what to do in each of them. Maybe, the
strategy method only captures the disposition to reciprocate that is de-
liberative in nature, while a more intuitive disposition to reciprocate is
not captured. We think that this can be tested experimentally, possibly
avoiding the strategy method to measure the disposition to reciprocate
and focusing instead on actual reciprocal behavior.
Another issue is related to the classification between conditional co-
operators and non-conditional cooperators. Recent work by Fallucchi,
Luccasen, and Turocy (2018) suggests to use hierarchical clustering anal-
ysis to construct a typology of behavior in the Public Goods Game. This
is an interesting methodology to deal with the classification of behavior-
ial types in the Public Goods Game, which imposes less restrictions than
more traditional ones (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001; Thöni and
Volk, 2018). It seems worth exploring the possibility of applying this
methodology considering both conditional cooperation strategies and
altruistic choices, possibly advancing on what has been attempted by
Kurzban and Houser (2005) and what we have done here.
Finally, one may wonder the reasons why beliefs – i.e., elicited ex-
pectations about others’ contributions in the Public Goods Game – ap-
parently matter per se and not only in relation with the disposition to
reciprocate. This could be due to the “false consensus effect” (Ross, D.
Greene, and House, 1977): participants who like to contribute more tend
to have more optimistic beliefs about others’ contributions (e.g., because
of introspection). If the role of beliefs is entirely due to the false consen-
sus effect and the false consensus effect is entirely driven by one’s own
disposition to donate, then such role should vanish when controlling for
the disposition to donate. Actually, we find that the role of beliefs is
reduced when controlling for the disposition to donate but it does not
disappear, suggesting that the false consensus effect depends at least in
part on some other preference and/or the role of beliefs is not entirely
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driven by the false consensus effect. Another possibility, which does not
rest on the false consensus effect, is that contributions are conditional
on beliefs due to other-regarding preferences different from the disposi-
tion to donate (e.g., positional concerns, compliance to social norms). In
this case beliefs would capture the effect of such preferences when con-
trols for them are omitted (Cooper and Kagel, 2016). Unfortunately, this
is not testable with our data as we lack proper measures of such other-
regarding preferences. Given the quantitative relevance of beliefs as a
positive predictor of contributions, we think that further experimental




4 Distribution of response times
In Figure 3 we report the distribution of the decision times in Study 1
and Study 2.
5 Main analyses with finer classifications of
nCC
In this section we provide replications of our main analyses in Study
1 and in Study 2 using the finer classifications of behavioral types de-
scribed in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and Thöni and Volk
(2018).
According to Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) participants are
classified as Conditional Cooperators if they either show contributions
that are non-decreasing in others’ contributions, with at least one in-
crease, or show a positive Spearman rank correlation (between contri-
butions and others’ contributions) that is significant at the 1%-level. Par-
ticipants are classified as Free Rider if they choose to contribute zero ir-
respective of others’ contributions. Participants are classified as Hump
Shaped if they show contributions that are increasing in others’ contribu-
tions up to some maximum and then contributions that are decreasing,




Figure 3: (a) Distribution of response times in Study 1; (b) distribution of re-
sponse times in Study 2, under the Time Pressure treatment; (c) distribution
of response times in Study 2, under the Motivated Delay treatment.
tions and others’ contributions) that is significant at the 1%-level. The
remaining participants are classified as Other.
According to Thöni and Volk (2018) participants are classified as
Conditional Cooperators if they either show contributions that are non-
decreasing in others’ contributions, with at least one increase, or show
a Pearson correlation of least 1/2 (between contributions and others’
contributions). Participants are classified as Free Rider as done in Fis-
chbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001). Participants are classified as Uncon-
ditional Cooperators if they contribute a given amount irrespective of
others’ contributions. Participants are classified as Hump Shaped (also
called Triangular cooperators) if their contributions reach a maximum at
a given level (k) of others’ contribution and they either show a strong
positive (negative) correlation to the left (right) of k (using at least three
contributions), or show contributions that are monotonically increasing
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(decreasing) to the left (right) of k (using at least two contributions). The
remaining participants are classified as Other.
Tables 7 and 8 report the regression analysis for Study 1, while Tables
9 and 10 report the regression analyses for Study 2, respectively using
the classification in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and the one in
Thöni and Volk (2018). The estimates for the coefficients of the relevant
variables (SVO, Cond.Coop., MD) largely confirm our main findings,
both in Study 1 and in Study 2. We opted not to include a dummy for
Free Riders, due to the small number of subjects classified as such. How-
ever, we do not exclude Free Raiders from the analysis, leaving them into
the residual omitted category of Other.
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Perc. Contribution Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
SVO 1.111∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗ 0.506∗∗
(0.314) (0.306) (0.240) (0.245)
Belief 1.300∗∗∗ 1.342∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗
(0.299) (0.295) (0.333) (0.331)
Cond.Coop. -8.055 -4.114 -15.58 -11.23
(24.85) (25.17) (26.50) (26.80)
Hump Shaped -27.06∗ -21.26 -27.05∗ -20.64
(15.25) (15.64) (14.88) (15.47)
Cond.Coop×Belief 0.350 0.296 0.436 0.378
(0.391) (0.394) (0.415) (0.418)
Controls:
Familiarity -4.149 2.341 -0.0622
(11.50) (9.514) (9.446)
Gender 3.610 6.293 6.815
(11.43) (9.176) (8.933)
Understood -20.14∗ -10.25 -10.56
(11.58) (9.655) (9.525)
Constant 30.02 37.00 7.173 -0.605 -12.52 -18.50
(19.07) (22.99) (19.80) (23.92) (19.89) (23.42)
N 120 120 120 120 120 120
pseudo R2 0.015 0.020 0.088 0.090 0.092 0.095
Table 7: Tobit regressions on the level of endowment contributed in the
one-shot PGG following the classification in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr
(2001). SVO is individuals’ social value orientation; Belief is the individuals’
belief about others’ contributions; Cond.Coop.=1 if an individual is consid-
ered as a conditional cooperator, 0 otherwise; Hump Shaped=1 if an individ-
ual is considered as a triangular cooperator, 0 otherwise; Robust standard
errors in parentheses, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, ***
denotes p < 0.01.
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Perc. Contribution Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
SVO 1.111∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗ 0.501∗∗
(0.314) (0.306) (0.235) (0.236)
Belief 1.357∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.315) (0.316) (0.318)
Cond.Coop. 12.96 15.47 4.921 7.597
(26.73) (27.21) (27.01) (27.62)
Uncond.Coop. 52.71∗∗∗ 51.11∗∗∗ 52.74∗∗∗ 51.05∗∗∗
(17.38) (17.46) (16.61) (16.73)
Hump Shaped -2.011 1.345 -2.913 0.522
(15.60) (16.56) (14.94) (15.98)
Cond.Coop.×Belief 0.316 0.277 0.401 0.360
(0.405) (0.408) (0.410) (0.414)
Controls:
Familiarity -4.149 1.698 -0.864
(11.50) (9.054) (9.958)
Gender 3.610 3.949 4.628
(11.43) (8.887) (8.727)
Understood -20.14∗ -7.247 -7.440
(11.58) (9.820) (9.624)
Constant 30.02 37.00 -14.73 -19.65 -33.53 -36.37
(19.07) (22.99) (21.82) (23.63) (21.56) (23.58)
N 120 120 120 120 120 120
pseudo R2 0.015 0.020 0.104 0.105 0.109 0.111
Table 8: Tobit regressions on the level of endowment contributed in the
one-shot PGG following the classification in Thöni and Volk (2018). SVO
is individuals’ social value orientation; Belief is the individuals’ belief about
others’ contributions; Cond.Coop.=1 if an individual is considered as a condi-
tional cooperator, 0 otherwise; Hump Shaped=1 if an individual is considered
as a triangular cooperator, 0 otherwise; Uncond.Coop.=1 if an individual is
considered as an unconditional cooperator, 0 otherwise. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, ***
denotes p < 0.01.
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Perc. Contribution Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MD 8.55 10.32 13.16∗ 14.58∗ 93.83∗ 92.27∗
(9.86) (9.80) (7.74) (7.53) (52.76) (51.11)
SVO 0.73∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Belief 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.24) (0.31) (0.31)
-37.04∗ -33.40 -11.54 -6.90
(20.58) (20.81) (26.05) (27.02)
Hump Shaped -28.30∗∗ -28.60∗∗ -12.24 -13.37
(11.93) (11.90) (14.38) (14.43)
Cond.Coop.×Belief 0.913∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.34 0.31












Familiarity -9.14 0.70 1.08
(9.94) (8.00) (7.75)
Understood -10.25 -12.34 -12.03
(12.31) (10.88) (10.25)
Gender 2.16 0.83 2.97
(10.28) (8.42) (8.37)
Constant 104.14∗∗∗ 126.27∗∗∗ -5.42 -5.68 -33.03 -34.30
(7.53) (26.09) (23.31) (29.82) (24.70) (32.83)
N 248 248 248 248 248 248
pseudo R2 0.001 0.002 0.069 0.070 0.077 0.078
Table 9: Tobit regressions on the level of endowment contributed in the
one-shot PGG, following the classification in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr
(2001). MD=1 if individuals are in the motivated delay condition, 0 oth-
erwise; SVO is the individuals’ social value orientation; Belief is the indi-
viduals’ belief about others’ contributions; Cond.Coop.=1 if an individual
is considered as a conditional cooperator, 0 otherwise; Hump Shaped=1 if
an individual is considered as a triangular cooperator, 0 otherwise; Under-
stood=1 if an individual answered correctly to all the control questions, 0
otherwise (1=21.77%). Robust standard errors in parentheses, where: * de-
notes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
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Perc. Predicted Contribution Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MD 8.55 10.32 11.89 13.25∗ 105.2∗ 105.4∗
(9.86) (9.80) (7.71) (7.49) (55.70) (55.20)
SVO 0.64∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Belief 0.67∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29)
Cond.Coop. -15.53 -11.40 3.50 8.86
(20.84) (20.95) (24.46) (25.31)
Uncond.Coop. 52.51∗∗∗ 52.56∗∗∗ 40.17∗∗ 40.16∗∗
(15.70) (15.36) (16.63) (16.65)
Hump Shaped 8.85 8.62 21.75 21.55
(16.19) (15.88) (19.51) (19.43)
Cond.Coop.×Belief 0.94∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.44 0.40














Familiarity -9.14 -2.13 -2.57
(9.935) (7.77) (7.531)
Understood -10.25 -11.21 -10.79
(12.31) (10.05) (9.51)
Gender 2.16 0.94 2.10
(10.28) (8.27) (8.21)
Constant 104.1∗∗∗ 126.3∗∗∗ -20.29 -14.22 -48.13∗ -41.28
(7.53) (26.09) (23.04) (30.67) (24.52) (33.05)
N 248 248 248 248 248 248
pseudo R2 0.001 0.002 0.078 0.079 0.087 0.089
Table 10: Tobit regressions on the level of endowment contributed in the
one-shot PGG, following the classification in Thöni and Volk (2018). MD=1
if individuals are under the motivated delay condition, 0 otherwise; SVO
is the individuals’ social value orientation; Belief is the individuals’ belief
about others’ contributions; Cond.Coop.=1 if an individual is considered as
a conditional cooperator, 0 otherwise; Hump Shaped=1 if an individual is
considered as a triangular cooperator, 0 otherwise; Uncond.Coop.=1 if an
individual is considered an a unconditional cooperator, 0 otherwise. Un-
derstood=1 if an individual answered correctly to all the control questions,
0 otherwise (1=21.77%). Robust standard errors in parentheses, where: *
denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
36
6 Study 1: Conditional Cooperation Strategies
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7 Study 2: Conditional Cooperation Strategies
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9 Instructions of Study 2
Study 2 has the same instructions as Study 1 except for the part of the









In the previous Chapters, we have highlighted that there is mixed evi-
dence on the role of cognition on cooperation and such mixed evidence
can be reconciled by taking into account different individual characteris-
tics, e.g., altruism and reciprocity.
In this Chapter we consider social norms and altruism, and we show
that cognitive manipulation impacts not only cooperation, and specif-
ically contributions in the Public Goods Game but also the associated
social norms (Conte, Andrighetto, and Campennı̀, 2014). Social norms
can be classified as descriptive and injunctive norms. The former refers
to beliefs about the most common behavior of people, while the latter
refers to perceptions about what people would approve or disapprove of
(Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren, 1990). They have been shown to drive peo-
ple’s behavior in several economic games involving prosociality (Aguiar,
Brañas-Garza, et al., 2010; Bicchieri and Chavez, 2010; Jachimowicz et al.,
2018; Szekely et al., 2021).
We ran an online study, implemented using the software oTree (Chen,
Schonger, and Wickens, 2016), where individuals play a one-shot anony-
mous Public Goods Game. We also measure descriptive and injunctive
This Chapter is based on Bilancini, Boncinelli, Capraro, and Celadin. (2020).
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norms associated to the Public Goods Game. Specifically, we use be-
liefs about others’ average contribution to the public good as a proxy for
the descriptive norms, and the evaluations of the social appropriateness
of all possible contribution levels as a proxy for the injunctive norms
(Krupka and R. A. Weber, 2013). We also computed a new measure of
norms compliance which is built on social appropriateness, that we call
“relative social appropriateness”: it captures the individuals’ assessment
of social appropriateness of their own choices with respect to all other
possible choices. Furthermore, we also include the social value orienta-
tion (SVO) as a proxy of altruism (Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf,
2011).
Our main results show that motivated delay significantly increases
the level of contribution and the descriptive norms, while making the
injunctive norms more extreme; instead altruism turns out to be not af-
fected by cognitive manipulation.
The Chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the experi-
ment design, Section 2 presents the results and Section 3 discusses.
1 Method
We conducted a pre-registered online experiment on July 24, 2019, im-
plemented in oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens, 2016). Participants
were recruited using Prolific (Palan and Schitter, 2018), and randomly
assigned to play a four-player one-shot anonymous Public Goods Game
in either of two treatments: the Time Pressure (TP) treatment and the Mo-
tivated Delay (MD) treatment. Each experimental subject was endowed
with 10 points, and was asked to choose how many points to contribute
to a common pool, where all points contributed were multiplied by 2
and then equally split among the four players. In the TP treatment, we
incentivized participants to make fast decisions: participants lose money
for every second taken to make the decision (Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani,
2020). In the MD treatment we incentivized participants to make delib-
erative decisions by paying them some money if they write a motivation
for their choice (Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Luini, 2020). Subsequently, we
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elicited participants’ beliefs about the average contribution of the other
three group members, the social appropriateness of each contribution
level (Krupka and R. A. Weber, 2013), and the SVO (Murphy, Acker-
mann, and Handgraaf, 2011). Finally, we asked participants comprehen-
sion questions and questions about their level of familiarity with the task
and their gender. We refer to the Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
for full details about the design, instructions, and the measures. All mea-
sures were incentivized. No deception was used. The overall average
earning was 0.78 GBP per participant, including 0.40 GBP show-up fee
(which translates into an average hourly wage of 5.09 GBP).
1.1 Measures of interest: Social Norms
We use the belief of the average contribution of the others as a proxy
of the descriptive norms. Social Appropriateness (SA) is computed by
converting participants’ guesses about other participants’ evaluation of
contribution levels into numerical scores (following Krupka and R. A.
Weber, 2013). An evaluation of “very socially inappropriate” received a
score of −1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” a score of −1/3, “some-
what socially appropriate” a score of 1/3, and “very socially appropri-
ate” a score of 1. Starting from SA we construct a measure of the RSA
of the contribution chosen by a participant, aiming at capturing the par-
ticipant’s assessment about the social appropriateness of his own choice
with respect to all other possible choices. Let SAi(s) denote the score
given by participant i to the contribution level s = 0, . . . , 10 and ci de-













which provides a normalized value of RSA comprised between −1 and
1. RSA is a measure that captures the social appropriateness of the own
contribution provided to the PGG with respect to all the others possible
level of contributions. Indeed a participant that evaluate the all the con-
tribution in the same way will get a score equal to 0, while a participant
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that evaluate her own contribution as very socially appropriate (inap-
propriate) will get a score of 1 (-1) that represents how appropriate is her
contribution with respect to the others.
1.2 Measures of interest: Social Value Orientation
We follow (Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf, 2011) to build a contin-
uous measure of SVO that captures altruism that is the extent to which an
agent is willing to reduce his own pay-off to make another agent better
off (or worse off). SVO is computed as follows:





where Āo and Ās are the average points allocated in the six tasks, re-
spectively, to the other and to oneself. Each individual gets a score that
is an angle between -16.26 and 61.39, resulting from the choices in the
allocation tasks. An angle between -12.04 and 22.45 corresponds to in-
dividualistic predispositions; in particular, an angle of 0 corresponds to
caring only for own pay-off. An angle between 22.45 and 57.15 corre-
sponds to prosociality; in particular, an angle of 45 gives equal weights
to own and others’ pay-off. An angle below -12.04 corresponds to a com-
petitive attitude (desire to get a higher pay-off compared with others).
An angle above 57.15 corresponds to altruistic attitudes (ready to pay a
cost to increase others’ pay-off).
2 Results
We collected data from N=688 participants, 344 per treatment. Sum-
mary statistics are reported in Table 14 in the Supplementary Material
for Chapter 2.
The mean contribution is significantly different in the two treatments
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z=3.757, p <0.001), with the average being
higher under motivated delay, see Figure 4a.
The mean belief about other’s average contribution in the two




Figure 4: (a) Mean of the level of contribution between treatments in the
PGG. (b) Mean of the level of descriptive norms between treatments in the
PGG. (c) Mean of the level of injunctive norms between treatments in the
PGG. (d) Mean of the level of relative social appropriateness between treat-
ments in the PGG. Confidence intervals are at 95%.
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Z=1.950, p=0.051), see Figure 4b. We interpret this as evidence that de-
scriptive norms are affected by cognitive manipulation: under motivated
delay individuals expect that others contribute more than they do under
time pressure.
Not surprisingly, the social appropriateness increases as a function
of the level of contribution, in both treatments. The interesting result is
that social appropriateness appears to depend on the modes of cogni-
tion. Specifically, contribution levels smaller than 5 tend to be perceived
to be less socially appropriate under motivated delay than under time
pressure (statistically significant effect at contribution levels 1,2 and 4;
trending in the same direction at contribution levels 0 and 5), see Figure
4c. Conversely, contribution levels greater than or equal to 5 tend to be
perceived to be more socially appropriate under motivated delay than
under time pressure, although the only significant effect is at the level
of full contribution. We also measure the consistency between the level
of contribution by participant to the PGG and how socially appropriate
they perceive that level of contribution. Distributions are reported in Ta-
ble 11.
Social Appropriateness Motivated Delay Time Pressure
Very Socially Inappropriate 4.65% 7.85%
Somewhat Socially Inappropriate 3.78% 7.85%
Somewhat Socially Appropriate 20.64% 24.13%
Very Socially Appropriate 70.93% 60.17%
Table 11: Distribution of the consistency between the level of contribution
by participants to the PGG and how socially appropriate they perceive that
level of contribution.
Also our measure of norm compliance, relative social appropriate-
ness, defined as the social appropriateness of one’s own choice minus
the average social appropriateness of all the other alternatives, appears
to depend on the modes of cognition, as it is significantly greater un-
der motivated delay than under time pressure (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
Z=3.135, p=0.002, see Figure 4d). We interpret these results as evidence
that our cognitive manipulation affects the injunctive norm, indeed for
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: (a) Mean of the switching point between treatments. (b) Presence
of the switching point between treatments
lower level of contribution the SA is lower under MD than TP, and for
higher level of contribution the SA is higher under MD than TP; this
makes the social appropriateness of the available choices more extreme,
and the compliance to the injunctive norm stronger.
Additionally, we consider the switching point between those contri-
butions that are perceived as “socially inappropriate” and those that are
perceived as “socially appropriate”. Such measure has a limitation, in-
deed it can not be calculated for participants who do not show a mono-
tonic evaluation of the social appropriateness of the contributions. For
the participants with a switching point, there is no statistically signif-
icant difference between the two treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
Z=-0.096, p=0.924, see Figure 5a). Overall, under MD a higher number of
individuals tends to show a switching point with respect to the TP treat-
ment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z=2.269, p=0.023, see Figure 5b). Indeed
the 80.81% of the participants under MD shows a switching point against
the 73.55% of the participants under TP.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the RSA and the descrip-
tive norms under the two cognitive manipulations, and those who have
higher RSA under both treatments have higher level of descriptive
norms, while those with a lower RSA have a lower level of descriptive
norms.
Finally, we find no statistical difference in the distribution of SVO
scores in the two treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z=0.466, p=0.641).
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Figure 6: Linear prediction of RSA as a function of Descriptive Norms
We interpret this as evidence that our cognitive manipulations do not
affect altruism.1 Results are reported in Table 12.
3 Discussion
We studied the effect of time pressure and motivated delay on cooper-
ation in a one-shot Public Goods Game and on two social norms asso-
ciated to this game, the descriptive norm and the injunctive norm. We
found that motivated delay, compared to time pressure, increases contri-
butions to the public good as well as the descriptive norm. Moreover,
it also affects the injunctive norm by making small contributions less
socially appropriate and large contributions more socially appropriate.
We also found that a measure of compliance to the injunctive norm in-
creases under motivated delay, suggesting that motivated delay makes
people more likely to follow the injunctive norm. Finally, we have also
looked at the effect of cognitive manipulation on Social Value Orienta-
tion. In line with previous work (Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani, 2020; Bi-
1Note that we pre-registered that we would use beliefs and (relative) social appropriate-
ness as independent variables. But, after collecting the data, we noticed that they depend




MD TP test (Z) p-value
Contribution 8.390 7.564 3.757 0.000
Belief 7.064 6.613 1.950 0.051
SA 0 -0.855 -0.814 -1.124 0.261
SA 1 -0.775 -0.677 -2.443 0.015
SA 2 -0.614 -0.510 -2.614 0.009
SA 3 -0.370 -0.308 -1.469 0.142
SA 4 -0.919 -0.105 -2.400 0.016
SA 5 0.190 0.169 0.540 0.590
SA 6 0.314 0.320 -0.372 0.710
SA 7 0.440 0.424 0.641 0.522
SA 8 0.643 0.630 0.159 0.874
SA 9 0.756 0.700 0.588 0.556
SA 10 0.845 0.746 2.667 0.008
RSA 0.377 0.290 3.135 0.002
SVO 32.128 30.954 0.466 0.641
Table 12: Mean and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the level of contribution to
the Public Goods Game, beliefs about others’ average contribution, social
appropriateness (SA) for each level of contribution, relative social appropri-
ateness (RSA), and social value orientation (SVO).
lancini, Boncinelli, and Celadin, 2020), we found no significant effect.
The fact that cognitive manipulation affects both contributions and
social norms opens to the possibility that social norms act as mediators
of the effect that cognition has on contributions. Our data do not allow
us to fully answer this question. However, they do allow us to test a
necessary condition of the mediating effect of the descriptive norm, that
is, that the residuals of the beliefs positively correlate with public goods
contributions. This turns out to be the case (ρ=0.512, p <0.001). Further
work should explore this question more in depth.
The fact that motivated delay increases cooperation is not inconsis-
tent with Rand’s (Rand, 2016) meta-analysis showing that, overall, de-
liberation decreases cooperation. As mentioned above, there is a lot of
heterogeneity across studies and specific manipulations may well have
different effects (Capraro, 2019). Future work should explore the psy-
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chological path through which motivated delay increases contributions.
One possibility is that asking people to write their motivation has the ef-
fect that people prefer to write altruistic/cooperative motivations rather
than selfish ones, in order to protect their self-image. Future work should
explore this as well as other potential motivations. Finally it would be
interesting to study the effect of Time Delay on cooperation and social
norms compared to Motivated Delay.
The results in this Chapter differ from the results in the first Chap-
ter. In fact, we find that contributions to the Public Goods Game and
belief about others’ behavior are higher under the treatments designed
to foster deliberation than under the one designed to foster intuition in
the second study of Chapter 2, while there is no difference in the level of
contributions provided to the Public Goods Game under the two cogni-
tive manipulations in Chapter 1. One possible explanation is related to
the detectable effect size in the study of Chapters 1 with respect to the
sample size in the study of Chapter 2. Indeed the sample size in the first
Chapter is half of the subjects collected in the second Chapter. A posteri-
ori sensitivity analysis shows that the detectable effect size for the study
in the first Chapter is f=0.37, while the effect size for the study in the sec-
ond Chapter is f=0.22 with alpha=0.05 and power 0.80. Furthermore, the
two Studies differ in the maximum possible level of contribution to the
PGG (20 points in the first Chapter and 10 points in the second Chapter).
It would be a possible source of variation that can be investigated. Fi-
nally, there can be another element of complexity, related to the possible
different role of belief that might capture descriptive norms or intuitive
reciprocity, but further research is needed to have a better understanding





Individuals were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: we
collected 344 subjects in each treatment. Participants were randomly as-
signed to play a four-player one-shot anonymous PGG in either of two
treatments. Each participant was endowed with 10 points, and they had
to decide how many points to contribute to a common pool. The total
group contribution was then doubled and redistributed evenly among
the participants of the group. No feedback was provided. In the TP treat-
ment, following (Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani, 2020), participants were en-
dowed with 10 additional points and 1 point was detracted from this
amount for each second taken by the subject to make the decision in
the PGG. In this way, subjects were incentivized to answer as quickly
as possible. After 10 seconds they could still make their decision, but
they could not gain the bonus anymore. In the MD treatment, following
(Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Luini, 2020), participants had to motivate their
level of contribution to the PGG and they were rewarded with 5 addi-
tional points if they gave a meaningful motivation of at least 40 charac-
ters. In the MD treatment, the 99.42% of the subjects provided a mean-
ingful sentence (342 out of 344) and in the TP treatment, the 85.47% of
the subjects (294 out of 344) managed to answer in 10 seconds.
After the one-shot PGG, we elicited an incentivized measure of par-
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ticipants’ beliefs about the average contribution to the PGG of the other
three group members. Participants obtained a bonus of 5 points if they
guessed correctly the average level of contribution (rounded to the clos-
est integer).
Following Krupka and R. A. Weber (2013) we elicited individuals’
assessment of SA about the level of contribution to the PGG. Partici-
pants were asked to guess other participants’ evaluation of each possible
level of contribution (from 0 to 10) as either “very socially inappropri-
ate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially appropri-
ate”, or “very socially appropriate”. To incentivize this measure, one
contribution between 0 and 10 was randomly picked and a bonus of 10
points was awarded to the participants whose guesses matched the me-
dian response of all the participants. Points awarded up to this stage
were converted according to the rate of 50 points = 0.50 GBP.
Subsequently, we elicited an incentivized measure of participants’
SVO consisting of a series of points allocation tasks that are a variant
of the dictator game (DG) (Engel, 2011), in the version of the six pri-
mary items by Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011), where par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to interact with a new participant (dif-
ferent from those whom they were playing with during the PGG). All
the participants completed the SVO measure. At the end of the task they
were randomly matched in pairs and randomly assigned to the role of
decision-maker or receiver. One of the six splits chosen by the decision-
maker was randomly selected to determine pay-offs in the pair. Points
awarded for the elicitation of SVO were converted according to the rate
of 100 points = 0.10 GBP. Lastly, participants were asked comprehension
and demographic questions.
The overall average earning was 0.78 GPB per participant, including
0.40 GPB of the show-up fee.
5 Further Analysis
Table 13 reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum for the non-incentivized mea-
sures about what participants think is the most likely action that other
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individuals will take when they face the following situation: your neigh-
bour/colleague/friend/family member finds a wallet in the street. An-
swers are converted as follow: “S/He brings it to the police station” as
a score of 1, “S/He asks people around there” has a score of 2, “S/He
leaves it there” has a score of 3 and “S/He takes it for her/himself” has
a score of 4.
Mean Mean Rank-sum
MD TP test (Z) p-value
Neighbour 2.401 2.343 0.655 0.512
Colleague 1.805 1.832 -0.354 0.724
Friend 1.709 1.738 -0.279 0.780
Family member 1.584 1.599 0.103 0.918
Table 13: Mean and Wilcoxon rank-sum test of what participants think is
the most likely action that other individuals will take when they face the fol-
lowing situation: your neighbour/colleague/friend/family member finds a
wallet in the street.
Table 14 reports distribution and the Wilcoxon rank-sum for the age
and gender.
Mean Mean Rank-sum
MD TP test (Z) p-value
Age 30.34 31.20 -1.543 0.123
























Dual-Process Theories posit that individuals’ decisions are the results
of the interplay between two cognitive processes (Evans and Stanovich,
2013), and it has been broadly employed to investigate, not only cooper-
ation (Rand, J. D. Greene, and Nowak, 2012; Rand, Peysakhovich, et al.,
2014; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2015; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2016; Bi-
lancini, Boncinelli, and Celadin, 2020; Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani, 2020;
Bilancini, Boncinelli, Capraro, et al., 2020), but also the effect that cog-
nition might have in behaving honestly (Gunia et al., 2012; Capraro,
2017; Lohse, Simon, and Konrad, 2018; Capraro, J. Schulz, and Rand,
2019), and according to deontology and utilitarianism (Suter and Her-
twig, 2011; D. D. Cummins and R. C. Cummins, 2012; Trémolière and
Bonnefon, 2014). To investigate the causal effect of the modes of cogni-
tion on the aforementioned behaviors, several experimental conditions
aimed at promoting reliance on intuition and deliberation have been de-
veloped, and the condition that has been widely used consists in manipu-
lating the response time given to people to make their decisions through
two treatments: Time Pressure (TP) and Time Delay (TD). In the TP con-
dition, individuals are forced to answer within a small amount of time
This Chapter is based on Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Celadin (2021).
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(e.g., 5-10 seconds), and this should increase the likelihood of observing
responses driven by the intuitive process. While in the TD treatment,
individuals are forced to answer after a certain amount of time (e.g., 10
seconds), and this should increase the likelihood of observing responses
driven by the deliberative process. Albeit many studies have employed
these time manipulations, it has never been tested whether such manip-
ulations foster intuition and deliberation.
In this Chapter, we propose an experimental design that allows us to
validate the effect of the cognitive manipulations through the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005; Branas-Garza, Kujal, and Lenkei,
2019), a measure of the cognitive reflection that is the ability or the dis-
position of an individual to engage in a more deliberative process and to
resist intuitive responses (Frederick, 2005). Our novelty is that we use the
responses given CRT as a proxy of the effectiveness of the manipulations.
The original version of the CRT is designed to trigger an intuitive but
incorrect answer while the correct answer is provided whether individ-
uals engage in further deliberation. One of the CRT’s original questions
by Frederick (2005) is: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs
$1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”, when individuals
face this problem, they tend to give the first response that comes to their
mind (10 cents), and they do not engage in further reflection to under-
stand which is the correct answer (5 cents). Another interesting feature
of the CRT is that it is a proxy of physiological characteristics (Bosch-
Domènech, Brañas-Garza, and Espın, 2014; Alonso et al., 2018), and it
has the property to predict individuals’ performance, decision-makers’
choices, and behaviors (Frederick, 2005; Campitelli and Labollita, 2010;
Besedeš et al., 2012; Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara, 2015; Andersson et al.,
2016; Albano et al., 2018).
We ran a pre-registered online study, implemented using the software
Qualtrics, where individuals have to answer the CRT in the long version
of six questions (CRT-L) by Primi et al. (2016) under a baseline condition
and the two time manipulations: TP to induce less deliberative answers,
and TD to induce more deliberative answers. We find that (i) TD in-
creases the likelihood to provide correct answers to the CRT-L, (ii) TP
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increases the likelihood to provide more non-intuitive incorrect answers
instead of more intuitive answers. In fact, there are two types of incor-
rect answers: intuitive but incorrect answers and non-intuitive incorrect
answers that include all the other possible answers to the CRT. Actually
intuitive but incorrect answers have been used as a measure of the dispo-
sition to behave intuitively (Cueva et al., 2016), although their reliability
has been criticized (Pennycook et al., 2016).
We provide empirical support and evidence of the effectiveness of
time manipulations, TD and TP, in inducing more and less deliberation,
respectively. Furthermore, through this novel approach, we extend the
CRT features that can be engaged not only as a measure of deliberation
but also as a proxy of the effectiveness of the cognitive manipulations.
Finally, this allows for a scalable and easily implementable measure that
can be used as a proxy of the cognitive manipulations’ effectiveness.
1 Methods
We recruited 598 participants using the online platform Prolific
(www.prolific.co; Palan and Schitter, 2018). The experiment took place
on August 4, 2020. Participants were randomly assigned to one out of
three conditions: Baseline, Time Pressure, and Time Delay conditions. In
each condition, participants had to answer the six questions of the CRT-L
(Primi et al., 2016) that were presented in random order. In the baseline
condition, participants had to answer each question without any time
constraint. In the Time Pressure condition, participants had to answer
each question within 30 seconds (Borghans, Meijers, and Ter Weel, 2008).
Participants who failed to answer within the time constraint were still
able to provide the answer to the questions: after the 30 seconds the
question was still shown. Overall the 94.69% of participants were able
to answer within the time constraint (in the Supplementary Material for
Chapter 3 we report the percentage of compliance for each question and
we run the main analysis restricting to those subjects who failed in an-
swering within the 30 seconds). In the Time Delay condition, participants
had to wait for one minute before they could insert an answer (Borghans,
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Meijers, and Ter Weel, 2008); only after this amount of time, they were
allowed to provide the answer. At the end of the experiment, we asked
participants their level of reflection in answering the CRT-L. Moreover,
we asked participants demographic information and their previous ex-
posure to the CRT-L (full instructions in the Supplementary Material for
Chapter 3). The participation fee was 0.63 GBP for a survey 6:46 min long
in mean.
2 Results at Question Level
We pre-registered a sample size of N=600. This was based on an a priori
power analysis that showed that 200 subjects per condition are enough
to detect a small effect size of f=0.25 with alpha=0.05 and power 0.80. Af-
ter downloading the data file on Qualtrics, we result in 598 observations
(the server failed at registering two observations). We collected 207 sub-
jects in the Baseline, 204 in the TP condition and 187 in the TD condition
(mean age=27.64, males=53.3%, females=46.7%).
Following our pre-registration, we first make an overall comparison
using Kruskal-Wallis at question level to test the difference in the dis-
tributions of the correct answers to each question of the CRT-L across
all treatment. Specifically, our main variable is a dummy variable that
takes value = 1 if the answer is correct, 0 otherwise. We find that the
distribution differs significantly across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis tests:
χ2=36.343, p<0.001).
The pairwise comparisons of the correct answers between each treat-
ment are statistically significant (see Figure 7a). Indeed the likelihood to
provide correct answers is statistically lower in the TP condition than in
the Baseline (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=3.167, p=0.002), while it is sta-
tistically higher in the TD condition than in the Baseline (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test: z=-2.959, p=0.003), and a fortiori higher in the TD condition
than in the TP condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=-6.027, p<0.001). In
Table 15 we run Logit regressions with standard errors clustered at the
individual level. Model 1 in Table 15 confirms that the TP condition de-
creases the probability to provide a correct answer to the CRT, while TD
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increases such probability. Our results hold even when we control for




Figure 7: (a) The mean of the correct answers given to the CRT-L across
treatments. (b) The mean of the intuitive answers given to the CRT-L across
treatments. (c) The mean of the non-intuitive incorrect answers given to the
CRT-L across treatments.
We now consider the distribution of the intuitive answers (the main
variable = 1 if individuals provided an intuitive response, 0 otherwise),
and we find that the distributions are slightly different (Kruskal-Wallis
tests: χ2=6.183, p=0.045). The pairwise comparisons between each treat-
ment is statistically significant, with the exception of the Baseline and the
TP condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test Baseline vs. TP: z=-0.277, p=0.782;
Wilcoxon rank-sum test Baseline vs. TD: z=2.031, p=0.042; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test TD vs. TP: z=2.294, p=0.022; see Figure 7b). Model 3 in
Table 15 confirms that the TP and TD condition does not affect the prob-
ability to provide an intuitive answer to the CRT. Our results hold even
when we control for gender, previous exposure to the CRT, question and
order fixed effects (Model 4).
77
Finally, when we consider the distribution of the non-intuitive in-
correct answers (the main variable = 1 if individuals provided a non-
intuitive incorrect response, 0 otherwise) we find that the distributions
differ significantly across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis tests: χ2=28.487,
p<0.001). The pairwise comparisons between each treatment and the
Baseline are statistically significant, with the exception of the Baseline
and the TD condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test Baseline vs. TP: z=-3.750,
p<0.001; Wilcoxon rank-sum test Baseline vs. TD: z=1.394, p=0.163;
Wilcoxon rank-sum test TD vs. TP: z=5.002, p<0.001; see Figure 7c).
Model 5 in Table 15 shows that TP increases the probability to provide
non-intuitive incorrect answers to the CRT, while TD has no effect. Re-
sults hold even when we control for gender, previous exposure, question
and order fixed effects (Model 6).
For completeness, we also report the Chi-squared test to test whether
correct, intuitive, and non-correct incorrect responses differ signifi-
cantly across treatments, and we confirm previous results (correct:
χ2(2)=36.353, p<0.001; intuitive: χ
2
(2)=6.185, p=0.045; non-intuitive incor-
rect: χ2(2)=28.495, p<0.001). We run a Fisher’s exact test to make the pair-
wise comparison, and we confirm previous results (see Table 16).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive
Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect
TP -0.261∗ -0.264 0.023 0.054 0.404∗∗ 0.334∗∗
(0.134) (0.163) (0.118) (0.133) (0.132) (0.153)
TD 0.245∗ 0.282∗ -0.170 -0.178 -0.170 -0.191
(0.135) (0.149) (0.119) (0.124) (0.141) (0.150)
Female -0.746∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗
(0.122) (0.101) (0.119)
Exposure 0.554∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ 0.045
(0.137) (0.121) (0.139)
No Compliance 0.025 -0.270 0.362∗
(0.231) (0.205) (0.220)
Question FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Order FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant -0.298∗∗ -0.300∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗ -1.795∗∗∗ -1.749∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.157) (0.084) (0.150) (0.095) (0.186)
N 3588 3588 3588 3588 3588 3588
pseudo R2 0.007 0.112 0.001 0.067 0.009 0.087
Table 15: Logit Regression on the likelihood to provide correct, intuitive,
and non-intuitive incorrect answers to the CRT-L. Correct=1 if the answer
is correct, 0 otherwise; Intuitive=1 if the answer is intuitive, 0 otherwise;
Non-Intuitive Incorrect=1 if the answer is non-intuitive incorrect, 0 other-
wise; TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay, 0 otherwise; TP=1 if an
individual is under Time Pressure, 0 otherwise; Female=1 if female, 0 other-
wise; Exposure=1 if individuals have seen someone of the CRT-L questions
or all of the CRT-L questions, 0 if individuals have seen none of the CRT-L
questions. No Compliance=1 if an individual did not comply with the time
manipulation, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the individual level, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, ***
denotes p < 0.01.
Fisher’s exact test
BL-TP BL-TD TP-MD
Correct p= 0.002 p= 0.003 p= 0.000
Intuitive p=0.807 2p=0.045 p=0.023
Non-intuitive incorrect p=0.000 p=0.182 p=0.000
N 207 204 187
Table 16: Fisher’s exact test. BL=Baseline; TP= Time Pressure and TD= Time
Delay.
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3 Results at Individual level
Our second pre-registered variables are the number of correct, intuitive
and non-intuitive incorrect answers given to the CRT-L at the individual
level. Following our pre-registration, we first make an overall compar-
ison using Kruskal-Wallis to test differences in the distributions across
all treatments. Figure 8a reports the distribution of the number of cor-
rect answers by treatment and the Kruskal-Wallis finds statistically sig-
nificant differences across treatments (χ2=13.858, p-value=0.001). Fig-
ure 8b reports the distribution of the number of intuitive answers by
treatment and the Kruskal-Wallis does not find any statistically signif-
icant difference across treatments (χ2=3.103, p-value=0.212). Figure 8c
reports the distribution of the number of non-intuitive incorrect answers
by treatment and the Kruskal-Wallis finds statistically significant differ-
ences across treatments (χ2=15.243, p-value=0.001).
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 8: (a) Distribution of the number of correct answers by treatment. (b)
Distribution of the number of intuitive answers by treatment. (c) Distribu-
tion of the number of non-intuitive incorrect answers by treatment.
We now compare each treatment with the Baseline and both time ma-
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Figure 9: (a) The mean of the correct answers given to the CRT-L across
treatments. (b) The mean of the intuitive answers given to the CRT-L across
treatments. (c) The mean of the non-intuitive incorrect answers given to the
CRT-L across treatments.
We find a slightly significant difference in the number of correct an-
swers given to the Baseline and TP condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test:
z=1.856, p-value=0.063). The difference between the Baseline and TD
condition is marginally statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test:
z=-1.880, p-value=0.060), and in the TP and TD condition (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: z=-3.742, p-value=0.000), see Figure 9a. These findings
are confirmed by the Tobit regression reported in Table 17; Model 1 sug-
gests that TP decreases the number of correct answers; we control for
previous exposure to the CRT-L and gender (Model 2).
The pairwise comparisons between the number of intuitive answers
fail to find a statistically significant difference across treatments (all p’s>
0.1, see Figure 9b). Indeed there is no significant difference in the number
of intuitive answers given to the Baseline and TP condition (Wilcoxon
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive
Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect
TP -0.548∗∗ -0.481∗ 0.053 0.004 0.535∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.258) (0.212) (0.204) (0.183) (0.181)
TD 0.431 0.422 -0.251 -0.236 -0.226 -0.241
(0.273) (0.261) (0.213) (0.203) (0.187) (0.187)
Female -1.281∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.166) (0.150)
Exposure 0.835∗∗∗ -0.879∗∗∗ -0.023
(0.243) (0.197) (0.173)
Constant 2.449∗∗∗ 2.784∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.081
(0.194) (0.219) (0.152) (0.172) (0.135) (0.165)
N 598 598 598 598 598 598
pseudo R2 0.005 0.026 0.001 0.023 0.010 0.015
Table 17: Tobit regressions on the number of correct answers given to the
CRT-L in Model 1 and 2. Tobit regressions on the number of intuitive an-
swers given to the CRT-L in Model 3 and 4. Tobit regressions on the num-
ber of non-intuitive incorrect answers given to the CRT-L in Model 5 and
6. TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay treatment, 0 otherwise; TP=1
if an individual is under Time Pressure treatment, 0 otherwise; Female=1
if female, 0 otherwise; Exposure=1 if individuals have seen someone of the
CRT-L questions or all of the CRT-L questions, 0 if individuals have seen
none of the CRT-L questions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, where:
* denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
rank-sum test: z=-0.204, p-value=0.838), in the Baseline and TD condi-
tion (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=1.422, p-value=0.155), and in the TP
and TD condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=1.632, p-value=0.103).
These findings are confirmed by the Tobit regression reported in Table
17; Model 3 suggests that there is no effect of the TP and TD treatments.
The result holds even when we control for previous exposure and gender
(Model 4).
We find a statistically significant differences in the pairwise com-
parisons between each treatment for the non-intuitive incorrect an-
swers (see Figure 9c) with the exception of the Baseline and the
TD condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test Baseline vs TP: z=-2.680, p-
value=0.007; Wilcoxon rank-sum test Baseline vs TD: z=1.212, p-
value=0.226; Wilcoxon rank-sum test TD vs TP: z=3.754, p-value=0.000).
These findings are confirmed by the Tobit regression reported in Table 17;
Model 5 suggests that TP increases the number of non-intuitive incorrect
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answers given to the CRT-L. The result holds even when we control for
previous exposure and gender (Model 6).
4 Gender and results at Question level
It the literature there is large evidence that CRT suffers of a strong gender
bias, indeed males perform significantly better than females (Frederick,
2005; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011; Holt, Porzio, and Song, 2017; Cueva
et al., 2016; Branas-Garza, Kujal, and Lenkei, 2019). Thus, we look at the




Figure 10: (a) The mean of the correct answers given to the CRT-L across
treatments and gender. (b) The mean of the intuitive answers given to the
CRT-L across treatments and gender. (c) The mean of the non-intuitive in-
correct answers given to the CRT-L across treatments and gender.
The likelihood of providing correct answers is higher for male than
female and this is confirmed by the Table 18, Model 1 and this is consis-
tent with the literature. Moreover, when we look at the effect of the two
treatments on male and female respectively, we have that the likelihood
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of providing correct answers for male is higher under MD with respect
to the baseline and TP. Under TP the likelihood is lower with respect to
the baseline (see Figure 10a). Results are confirmed by Model 3 of Table
18). There is no difference in the likelihood of providing correct answers
for female under MD with respect to the baseline. TP decreases the likeli-
hood with respect to both the baseline and the MD treatment (see Figure
10a). Results are confirmed by Model 2 of Table 18). Overall, on one hand
it seems that males are more responsive to the cognitive manipulations
with respect to females, while on the other hand it seems that exposure
to the CRT increases the likelihood of providing correct answer for fe-
males but not for males. Please, for the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests refer to
the Figure 10a.
The likelihood of providing intuitive answers is higher for female
than male and this is confirmed by the Table 18, Model 4, and our re-
sult is consistent with the literature. Again, we look at the effect of the
two treatments on male and female respectively, and we have that for
males under MD the likelihood of providing intuitive answers is lower
with respect to the baseline and TP. There is no difference between in the
likelihood of providing intuitive answers the baseline and TP treatment
(see Figure 10b). Results are confirmed by Model 6 of Table 18). For fe-
males with respect to male there is no difference in the likelihood across
treatments (Figure 10b). Results are confirmed by Model 5 of Table 18.
Also in this case, it seems that males are more responsive to the cogni-
tive manipulations with respect to females, while it seems that exposure
to the CRT decreases the likelihood of providing correct answer for both
males and females. Please, for the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests refer to the
Figure 10b.
Finally, the likelihood of providing non-intuitive incorrect answers
is the same for female and male and this is confirmed by the Table 18,
Model 7. When we look at the effect of the two treatments on male and
female respectively, we have that for males under MD the likelihood of
providing non-intuitive incorrect answers decreases with respect to the
baseline and TP (see Figure 10c). Results are confirmed by Model 9 of
Table 18). For females, TP increases the likelihood of providing non-
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intuitive incorrect answers (Figure 10c). Results are confirmed by Model
8 of Table 18. Please, for the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests refer to the Figure
10c.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive
Correct Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect
TP -0.252 -0.226 -0.312 0.161 -0.098 0.204 0.184 0.473∗∗ 0.199
(0.212) (0.235) (0.217) (0.178) (0.193) (0.181) (0.222) (0.201) (0.230)
TD 0.439∗∗ 0.068 0.449∗∗ -0.359∗∗ 0.017 -0.367∗∗ -0.221 -0.153 -0.229
(0.203) (0.224) (0.201) (0.174) (0.184) (0.173) (0.229) (0.193) (0.229)
Female -0.619∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.154
(0.211) (0.175) (0.199)
TP×Female -0.036 -0.218 0.302
(0.297) (0.247) (0.279)
TD×Female -0.355 0.364 0.071
(0.297) (0.248) (0.298)
Exposure 0.552∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.298 -0.560∗∗∗ -0.818∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗ 0.040 0.025 0.063
(0.137) (0.200) (0.183) (0.121) (0.180) (0.162) (0.139) (0.181) (0.210)
No Compliance 0.017 -0.323 0.310 -0.249 -0.061 -0.466 0.350 0.413 0.248
(0.232) (0.348) (0.328) (0.205) (0.258) (0.345) (0.219) (0.312) (0.292)
Question FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.351∗∗ -1.165∗∗∗ -0.209 -0.312∗ 0.209 -0.340∗ -1.682∗∗∗ -1.355∗∗∗ -1.871∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.229) (0.191) (0.165) (0.208) (0.188) (0.209) (0.231) (0.258)
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male
N 3588 1674 1914 3588 1674 1914 3588 1674 1914
pseudo R2 0.113 0.111 0.091 0.070 0.076 0.057 0.088 0.100 0.078
Table 18: Logit Regression on the likelihood to provide correct, intuitive, and non-intuitive incorrect answers to
the CRT-L. Correct=1 if the answer is correct, 0 otherwise; Intuitive=1 if the answer is intuitive, 0 otherwise; Non-
Intuitive Incorrect=1 if the answer is non-intuitive incorrect, 0 otherwise; TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay,
0 otherwise; TP=1 if an individual is under Time Pressure, 0 otherwise; Female=1 if female, 0 otherwise; Exposure=1 if
individuals have seen someone of the CRT-L questions or all of the CRT-L questions, 0 if individuals have seen none
of the CRT-L questions. No Compliance=1 if an individual did not comply with the time manipulation, 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p <
0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
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5 Gender and results at Individual level
We now look at the effect of the cognitive manipulations for males and
females, taking into account the answers to the CRT-L at individual level.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 11: (a) The mean of the correct answers given to the CRT-L across
treatments and gender. (b) The mean of the intuitive answers given to the
CRT-L across treatments and gender. (c) The mean of the non-intuitive in-
correct answers given to the CRT-L across treatments and gender.
Overall, the number of correct answers is higher for male than female
and this is confirmed in Table 19, Model 1 and this is consistent with the
literature. Moreover, when we look at the effect of the two treatments
on male and female respectively, we have that males provide a higher
number of correct answers under MD with respect to TP and the baseline
(see Figure 11a). Results are confirmed by Model 3 of Table 19). For
females, the number of correct answers is the slightly higher under MD
with respect TP, but overall there is no difference across treatments. (see
Figure 11a). Results are confirmed by Model 2 of Table 19). Overall,
one one hand it seems that males are more responsive to the cognitive
manipulations with respect to females, while on the other hand it seems
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that exposure to the CRT increases the likelihood of providing correct
answer for females but not for males. Please, for the Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests refer to the Figure 11a.
We now consider the intuitive answers and we have that the number
of intuitive answers is higher for female than male and this is confirmed
by the Table 19, Model 4, and our result is consistent with the literature.
If we look at the effect of the two treatments on male and female respec-
tively, we have that for males under MD the number of intuitive answers
is lower with respect to TP and Baseline (see Figure 11b). Results are
confirmed by Model 6 of Table 19). For females there is no difference in
the number intuitive answers across treatments (Figure 11b). Results are
confirmed by Model 5 of Table 19. Also in this case, it seems that males
are more responsive to the cognitive manipulations with respect to fe-
males, while it seems that exposure to the CRT decreases the likelihood
of providing correct answer for both males and females. Please, for the
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests refer to the Figure 11b.
Finally, females and males provide the same number of non-intuitive
incorrect answers and this is confirmed by the Table 19, Model 7. When
we look at the effect of the two treatments on male and female respec-
tively, we have that males under MD provide a slightly lower number of
non-intuitive incorrect answers with respect to TP and Baseline (see Fig-
ure 11c). Results are confirmed by Model 8 of Table 19), although they
are not significant. For females under TP the number of non-intuitive
incorrect answers is haigher with respect to MD and the Baseline (Figure
11c). Results are confirmed by Model 8 of Table 19 although they are not
statistically significant. Please, for the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests refer to
the Figure 11c.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive
Correct Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect
TP -0.452 -0.536 -0.469 0.218 -0.196 0.227 0.322 0.675∗∗∗ 0.335
(0.366) (0.346) (0.373) (0.288) (0.283) (0.289) (0.262) (0.238) (0.277)
TD 0.713∗ 0.048 0.747∗∗ -0.498∗ 0.075 -0.520∗ -0.255 -0.206 -0.265
(0.366) (0.359) (0.374) (0.281) (0.290) (0.283) (0.273) (0.236) (0.289)
Female -1.050∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.298
(0.370) (0.290) (0.248)
TP×Female -0.083 -0.429 0.377
(0.511) (0.407) (0.359)
TD×Female -0.638 0.546 0.042
(0.516) (0.401) (0.369)
Exposure 0.833∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 0.417 -0.871∗∗∗ -1.332∗∗∗ -0.474∗ -0.030 0.051 -0.130
(0.242) (0.336) (0.341) (0.195) (0.287) (0.263) (0.173) (0.218) (0.272)
Constant 2.685∗∗∗ 1.540∗∗∗ 2.809∗∗∗ 2.332∗∗∗ 3.311∗∗∗ 2.207∗∗∗ 0.152 0.482∗∗∗ 0.096
(0.269) (0.248) (0.282) (0.209) (0.204) (0.218) (0.195) (0.186) (0.221)
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male
N 598 279 319 598 279 319 598 279 319
pseudo R2 0.027 0.019 0.009 0.025 0.024 0.009 0.016 0.018 0.005
Table 19: Tobit regressions on the number of correct answers given to the CRT-L in Model 1 and 2. Tobit regressions
on the number of intuitive answers given to the CRT-L in Model 3 and 4. Tobit regressions on the number of
non-intuitive incorrect answers given to the CRT-L in Model 5 and 6. TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay
treatment, 0 otherwise; TP=1 if an individual is under Time Pressure treatment, 0 otherwise; Female=1 if female,
0 otherwise; Exposure=1 if individuals have seen someone of the CRT-L questions or all of the CRT-L questions,
0 if individuals have seen none of the CRT-L questions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, where: * denotes
p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
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6 Discussion
In this Chapter, we have studied the effect of the Time Delay (TD) and
Time Pressure (TP) treatments on the likelihood to provide correct, intu-
itive, and non-intuitive incorrect answers to the CRT-L, respectively. In
particular, we have used the CRT-L by Primi et al. (2016) to test whether
time manipulations are effective at fostering deliberation.
Results show that TD increases the likelihood of providing correct
answers, hence suggesting that TD induces more deliberation. On the
other hand, TP increases the likelihood of providing non-intuitive incor-
rect answers, hence suggesting that TP induces less deliberation.
It is interesting to understand why TP has such an effect on the CRT-L
responses. Our results can be interpreted in two ways. One possibility is
that when individuals are under TP, they do not rely much on their intu-
ition, but they fail to reason correctly, and this leads to more noise instead
of more intuitive responses. Another possibility is related to what CRT
captures. Indeed there is evidence that, albeit CRT is a reliable measure
of deliberation, it is not a reliable measure of intuition (Pennycook et al.,
2016). It has been shown that CRT correlates with the Need for Cogni-
tion (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982), a scale that measures the tendency of
individuals to engage in complex cognitive tasks, but not with the Faith
on Intuition (Epstein et al., 1996), a scale that measures the individuals’
tendency in engaging in effortless and intuitive tasks. To distinguish be-
tween these two possible interpretations, it seems worth exploring the
possibility of constructing a reliable measure of actual intuitive decision
making that is able to also capture intuitive thinking.
One might whether our results are driven by numeracy ability that
correlates with CRT. It seems reasonable not to worry about such possi-
ble confounding effect because our sample is well balanced across treat-
ments with respect to gender, age, student status, employee status, and
level of education. Further evidence could be obtained by verifying a
new version of the CRT that does not involve numerical abilities has been
developed (Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016).
Overall we confirm previous results on gender bias in answering the
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CRT. Indeed females provided a higher number of intuitive responses
and a lower number of correct answers with respect to males. Males
seems to be more responsive to the cognitive manipulations than fe-
males. Moreover, females tend to perform better the more they are ex-
posed to the CRT-L.
Our experiment was run in an online setting, and it would be of great
interest to investigate whether our results can be replicated in the lab
environment. Moreover, it would be interesting to run a study that is
able to detect a small effect, which is f=0.25; this because we cannot ex-
clude that the manipulation actually works although the effect is smaller
than we could detect. Finally, if our novel approach is noteworthy, it
can be used to test the effectiveness of the other manipulations that have
been implemented to induce reliance on deliberation and intuition such
as cognitive load (Swann et al., 1990; Gilbert and Hixon, 1991; Gilbert,
Tafarodi, and Malone, 1993; J. F. Schulz et al., 2014), conceptual priming
(Rand, J. D. Greene, and Nowak, 2012; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungod-
den, 2013; Shenhav, Rand, and J. D. Greene, 2012; Capraro, Everett, and
Earp, 2019), motivated delay (Takemura, 1993; Bilancini, Boncinelli, and
Luini, 2020; Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Celadin, 2020; Bilancini, Boncinelli,
Capraro, et al., 2020; Bilancini, Boncinelli, and Spadoni, 2021), and ego
depletion (Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister, 1998; Baumeister et al., 1998;
Baumeister, 2002; Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, and Wagner, 2018; Muraven
and Slessareva, 2003; Wang et al., 2017). This experimental setting can be





In Table 20 we report the percentage of the main characteristics of the
sample across treatments. The distribution of individuals’ characteristics
is well balanced across treatments.
Variable Mean MW test, p-values diff=0
BL TD MD BL-TP BL-TD TP-TD
Female 0.44 0.50 0.74 0.2208 0.4763 0.6285
Age 27.64 28.07 27.19 0,4851 0.5470 0.1878
Student Status 0.30 0.34 0.28 0.4013 0.6495 0.2046
Employee Status 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.7534 0.2857 0.4487
Education 1.67 1.73 1.62 0.8267 0.9834 0.8204
Previous Experience 1.53 1.53 1.45 0.7004 0.1211 0.2521
N 207 204 187
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics. BL=Baseline; TP= Time Pressure and TD=
Time Delay. Female=1 if the individual is a female; Age is the individual’s
age; Student Status=1 if the individual is a student at the moment of the
experiment; Employee Status=1 if the individual is an employee at the mo-
ment of the experiment; Education=1 if the individual level of education is
Secondary School, 2 if the individual level of education is Bachelor, 3 if the
individual level of education is Master, 4 if the individual level of education
is PhD, 0 otherwise; Previous Experience=1 if individuals have never seen
the study, 2 if individuals have seen a similar study and 3 if individuals
have seen exactly this study.
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Figure 12: Level of Reflection engaged by the participants in answering the
CRT-L across treatments.
As pre-registered, we look at the level of reflection engaged by the
participants. Specifically, we asked participants how much they reflected
upon the 6 answers of the CRT-L through a scale that goes from 0 (which
means “I did not reflect at all”) to 10 (which means “I reflected the max-
imum possible”). The distribution of the level of reflection is different
across treatments, indeed the Kruskal-Wallis test finds statistically sig-
nificant differences across treatments (χ2=11.073, p-value=0.004). The
pairwise comparison between treatments shows that individuals under
TP reflected significantly less with respect to those under TD condition
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=-3.298, p-value=0.001). Between the TP con-
dition and the Baseline there is no statistical difference (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test:z=1.639, p-value=0.101). Finally, individuals under TD reflected
significantly more with respect to those under the Baseline (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: z=-1.790, p-value=0.073), see Figure 12.
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8 Time Analysis
We now analyse the average time spent by participants in answering the
CRT-L questions across treatments. Figure 13 reports that the time spent
in the Baseline is significantly higher compared with the time spent in
the TP condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=8.724, p-value=0.000), and
significantly lower with respect to the TD condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test: z=-15.695, p-value=0.000). Individuals spent a greater amount of
time under TD condition than under the TP condition (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test: z=-17.087, p-value=0.000).
Figure 13: The average time spent in answering the CRT-L questions across
treatments.
We report in Table 22 the compliance with the TP manipulations. For
completeness, we run the main analysis by excluding those participants
who failed in answering the CRT-L questions within the 30 seconds in
the TP condition. Results are robust and we confirm the findings that we
have obtained in the main analysis.
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CRT-L Answers Within the 30s Answers After the 30s
CRT 1 96.08% 3.92%
CRT 2 92.65% 7.35%
CRT 3 93.14% 6.86%
CRT 4 99.02% 0.98%
CRT 5 97.06% 2.94%
CRT 6 90.20% 9.8%
Table 21: Percentage of individual that answered within the 30 seconds in
the TP time constraint for each question of the CRT. CRT1 corresponds to the
first question of the CRT-L presented in the Instruction, CRT2 to the second
one, and so on.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive Non-Intuitive
Correct Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect
TP -0.243∗ -0.265 -0.318 0.057 0.053 0.207 0.322∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.207
(0.144) (0.162) (0.220) (0.125) (0.133) (0.183) (0.143) (0.153) (0.183)
TD 0.245∗ 0.280∗ 0.438∗∗ -0.170 -0.179 -0.361∗∗ -0.170 -0.186 -0.361∗∗
(0.135) (0.148) (0.202) (0.119) (0.124) (0.174) (0.141) (0.151) (0.174)
Female -0.710∗∗∗ -0.618∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.211) (0.105) (0.175) (0.126) (0.175)
Exposure 0.551∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.520∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.142) (0.125) (0.124) (0.147) (0.124)
TP×Female 0.114 -0.316 -0.316
(0.319) (0.264) (0.264)
TD×Female -0.354 0.363 0.363
(0.297) (0.248) (0.248)
Question FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Order FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant -0.298∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗ -0.392∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.275∗ -0.264 -1.795∗∗∗ -1.745∗∗∗ -0.264
(0.095) (0.160) (0.178) (0.084) (0.153) (0.167) (0.095) (0.195) (0.167)
N 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318
pseudo R2 0.007 0.108 0.110 0.002 0.067 0.070 0.006 0.086 0.070
Table 22: Logit regressions on the likelihood to provide correct, intuitive,
and non-intuitive incorrect answers to the CRT-L Correct=1 if the answer
is correct, 0 otherwise; Intuitive=1 if the answer is intuitive, 0 otherwise;
Non-Intuitive Incorrect=1 if the answer is non-intuitive incorrect, 0 other-
wise; TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay, 0 otherwise; TP=1 if an
individual is under Time Pressure, 0 otherwise; Female=1 if female, 0 other-
wise; Exposure=1 if individuals have seen someone of the CRT-L questions
or all of the CRT-L questions, 0 if individuals have seen none of the CRT-L
questions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual
level, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
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9 CRT: order effect
We now re-run the main analysis taking into account only the first half
of the questions presented to the participants and the second half of the
questions presented to the participants respectively. In Table 23 we run
logit regressions with standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Regressions suggest that the estimated coefficients (although statistical
significance changes) are similar for the first and second half of the ques-
tions (see Model 1 and Model 4); results hold even when we control
for gender, exposure, question and order effects (Model 2 and Model
5). The likelihood to provided intuitive answers is similar under MD,
while it seems to be higher in the TP conditions for the second half of
the questions of the CRT-L (Model 7 and Model 10); results hold even
when we control for gender, exposure, question and order effects (Model
8 and Model 11). The coefficients are stable for the non-intuitive incorrect
answers under both TD and TP, but the statistical significance changes
(Models from 13 to 16).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Non-Int Non-Int Non-Int Non-Int Non-Int Non-Int
Correct Correct Correct Correct Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect
1-3 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6 4-6 1-3 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6 4-6 1-3 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6 4-6
TP -0.191 -0.245 -0.278 -0.333∗∗ -0.277 -0.217 -0.114 -0.108 0.022 0.158 0.206 0.291 0.529∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.470∗ 0.282∗ 0.095 0.291
(0.145) (0.174) (0.222) (0.155) (0.181) (0.236) (0.137) (0.155) (0.203) (0.138) (0.156) (0.208) (0.166) (0.186) (0.256) (0.168) (0.197) (0.208)
TD 0.285∗ 0.293∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.205 0.275 0.424∗ -0.226 -0.225 -0.399∗ -0.115 -0.125 -0.317 -0.146 -0.142 -0.238 -0.192 -0.257 -0.317
(0.147) (0.162) (0.224) (0.153) (0.167) (0.225) (0.138) (0.146) (0.210) (0.142) (0.147) (0.207) (0.189) (0.195) (0.292) (0.177) (0.187) (0.207)
Female -0.725∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.177 0.276∗ 0.509∗∗
(0.134) (0.226) (0.137) (0.239) (0.120) (0.198) (0.119) (0.213) (0.150) (0.259) (0.150) (0.213)
Exposure 0.542∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.005 0.072 -0.587∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.141) (0.141) (0.136) (0.136) (0.172) (0.172) (0.169) (0.136)
No Compliance 0.089 0.076 -0.042 -0.044 -0.106 -0.087 -0.428∗ -0.406∗ 0.030 0.025 0.691∗∗ -0.406∗
(0.274) (0.273) (0.267) (0.269) (0.255) (0.255) (0.232) (0.230) (0.277) (0.278) (0.277) (0.230)
TP×Female 0.069 -0.149 -0.262 -0.174 0.202 -0.174
(0.321) (0.336) (0.289) (0.290) (0.350) (0.290)
TD×Female -0.376 -0.346 0.342 0.391 0.195 0.391
(0.326) (0.336) (0.294) (0.297) (0.393) (0.297)
Question FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Order FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant -0.295∗∗∗ -0.215 -0.251 -0.302∗∗∗ -0.294 -0.360∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.221 -0.221 -0.308∗∗∗ -0.340∗ -0.311 -1.869∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -1.724∗∗∗ -1.728∗∗∗ -0.311
(0.101) (0.176) (0.193) (0.110) (0.183) (0.203) (0.093) (0.167) (0.180) (0.101) (0.180) (0.196) (0.124) (0.226) (0.251) (0.119) (0.229) (0.196)
N 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794
pseudo R2 0.007 0.108 0.109 0.009 0.117 0.117 0.001 0.065 0.068 0.002 0.073 0.075 0.013 0.077 0.078 0.006 0.107 0.075
Table 23: Logit regressions on the likelihood to provide correct, intuitive, and non-intuitive incorrect answers to
the CRT-L. Correct=1 if the answer is correct, 0 otherwise;- Intuitive=1 if the answer is intuitive, 0 otherwise; Non-
Int Incorrect=1 if the answer is non-intuitive incorrect, 0 otherwise; TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay, 0
otherwise; TP=1 if an individual is under Time Pressure, 0 otherwise; Female=1 if female, 0 otherwise; Exposure=1 if
individuals have seen someone of the CRT-L questions or all of the CRT-L questions, 0 if individuals have seen none
of the CRT-L questions. No Compliance=1 if an individual did not comply with the time manipulation, 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p <
0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
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10 The original CRT
We now consider the effect of the time manipulations on the three orig-
inal questions of the CRT (Frederick, 2005) and the three new questions
of the CRT-L (Primi et al., 2016). When we consider the probability to
provide a correct answer, we have that the effect of the treatments is
stronger for the new CRT-L questions than the three original CRT ques-
tions, as shown by the Logit regression in Table 24 (Models 1 and 4);
results hold even when we control for previous exposure to the CRT-L,
gender, question and order fixed effects (Models 2 and 5). When we con-
sider the probability to provide intuitive answers, we again find that the
effect of the treatments is stronger for the new CRT-L questions than the
three original CRT questions (Models 7 and 10); results hold even when
we control for previous exposure to the CRT-L, gender, question and or-
der fixed effects (Models 8 and 11). Finally, the probability of providing
non-intuitive incorrect answers is similar under both treatments (Model
13 and 16); results hold even when we control for previous exposure,
gender, question and order fixed effects (Models 14 and 17).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Correct Correct Correct Correct Correct Correct Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Intuitive Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect
Original Original Original New New New Original Original Original New New New Original Original Original New New New
TP -0.218 -0.156 -0.242 -0.305∗∗ -0.389∗∗ -0.269 -0.043 -0.056 0.102 0.092 0.163 0.219 0.548∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗ 0.350 0.314∗∗ 0.262 0.057
(0.161) (0.181) (0.230) (0.133) (0.175) (0.229) (0.144) (0.163) (0.213) (0.129) (0.144) (0.200) (0.189) (0.211) (0.290) (0.148) (0.172) (0.250)
TD 0.134 0.131 0.361 0.356∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗ -0.089 -0.078 -0.354∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.287∗∗ -0.364∗ -0.121 -0.131 -0.098 -0.203 -0.235 -0.306
(0.162) (0.165) (0.220) (0.137) (0.168) (0.227) (0.149) (0.153) (0.209) (0.136) (0.142) (0.199) (0.200) (0.204) (0.290) (0.169) (0.184) (0.271)
Female -0.755∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.746∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.122 0.051 0.413∗∗∗ 0.213
(0.138) (0.230) (0.137) (0.237) (0.126) (0.211) (0.112) (0.201) (0.159) (0.286) (0.139) (0.238)
Exposure 0.797∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.269∗ 0.272∗ -0.836∗∗∗ -0.834∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.267∗∗ 0.063 0.059 0.030 0.024
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.147) (0.147) (0.130) (0.130) (0.186) (0.186) (0.152) (0.151)
No Compliance -0.159 -0.179 0.228 0.240 -0.130 -0.100 -0.409∗ -0.398∗ 0.429 0.420 0.272 0.258
(0.271) (0.271) (0.254) (0.254) (0.254) (0.251) (0.223) (0.223) (0.278) (0.276) (0.253) (0.254)
TP×Female 0.185 -0.281 -0.321 -0.113 0.195 0.407
(0.331) (0.325) (0.299) (0.271) (0.383) (0.323)
TD×Female -0.536 -0.181 0.581∗ 0.150 -0.062 0.155
(0.341) (0.335) (0.312) (0.283) (0.404) (0.365)
Question FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Order FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant -0.381∗∗∗ -0.266∗ -0.309∗ -0.217∗∗ -0.222 -0.285 -0.029 -0.263∗ -0.235 -0.531∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗ -0.292∗ -2.181∗∗∗ -1.998∗∗∗ -1.965∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗ -1.879∗∗∗ -1.782∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.148) (0.170) (0.096) (0.153) (0.175) (0.101) (0.141) (0.163) (0.096) (0.138) (0.160) (0.141) (0.200) (0.228) (0.110) (0.182) (0.209)
N 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794
pseudo R2 0.004 0.061 0.065 0.013 0.166 0.166 0.000 0.068 0.074 0.004 0.053 0.054 0.013 0.042 0.042 0.007 0.102 0.103
Table 24: Logit regressions on the likelihood to provide correct, intuitive, and non-intuitive incorrect answers to
the CRT-L. Correct=1 if the answer is correct, 0 otherwise; Intuitive=1 if the answer is intuitive, 0 otherwise; Non-
Int Incorrect=1 if the answer is non-intuitive incorrect, 0 otherwise; TD=1 if an individual is under Time Delay, 0
otherwise; TP=1 if an individual is under Time Pressure, 0 otherwise; Female=1 if female, 0 otherwise; Exposure=1 if
individuals have seen someone of the CRT-L questions or all of the CRT-L questions, 0 if individuals have seen none
of the CRT-L questions. No Compliance=1 if an individual did not comply with the time manipulation, 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level, where: * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p <
0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.
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11 Instructions
Below we provide full instructions of our Study
WELCOME!
Please before starting, enter your Prolific ID.
next
Processing Personal Data
You will not be asked to provide any personally-identifying information
during this study. Your data will be anonymous and confidential
(i.e., any information you provide cannot be traced back to you). The
information collected may be used in future projects closely related
to this research. The result of this study will be published on journal
articles and presented at conferences. The raw data (from which you
cannot be identified) will be kept for a minimum period of five years
after the publication process is complete.
We will ask you to complete a quick task and a short question-
naire. We invite you to focus on the study, it should take approximately
6 minutes to complete it. Please avoid distractions during the study,
silence your mobile phone and turn off the television/music. Please
note that you have the right to withdraw consent at any time.
You can reach out to the researcher (tatiana.celadin@imtlucca.it) if
you have any questions related to this study.
Clicking on the Agree button below indicates that:
• You have read the above information;
• You voluntarily agree to participate;
• You are at least 18 years of age.
If you do not wish to participate in this research study, please decline
participation by clicking on the Disagree button, you will be redirected
to Prolific main page.
100
next
(Individuals under the Baseline condition faced these Instructions)
Instructions
In the following screens you will be asked 6 different questions.
Please choose what you think is the correct answer for each question.
(Individuals under the Time Pressure condition faced these Instructions)
Instructions
In the following screens you will be asked 6 different questions.
Please choose what you think is the correct answer for each question.
Try to answer each question within 30 seconds.
(Individuals under the Time Delay condition faced these Instructions)
Instructions
In the following screens you will be asked 6 different questions.
Please choose what you think is the correct answer for each question.
You have to wait 1 minute before entering your answer.
next
Question
A pen and a paper cost $1.10 in total. The pen costs $1.00 more than the
paper. How much does the paper cost?
Only participants in the TD condition faced the following instructions above
the box where they were allowed to insert the answer
After one minute has passed, a box will appear here below where you
can write your answer.
Only participants under the Time Pressure and only those who failed to answer
within 30 seconds faced the same CRT question with the following instructions:
Please try to answer the question in a short amount of time
Time taken to answer the question: a timer was shown to the participants
next
Question
If it takes 5 nurses 5 minutes to measure the blood pressure of 5 patients,





In a rabbit breeding farm, each rabbit lives in 1 cage. The rabbit popula-
tion doubles every month. If it takes 48 months to fill all the cages in the
farm, how long would it take to fill half of them?
next
Question
If 3 elves can wrap 3 toys in 1 hour, how many elves are needed to wrap
6 toys in 2 hours?
next
Question
Jerry received the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class.
How many students are there in the class?
next
Question
In an athletics team, tall members are three times more likely to win a
medal than short members. This year the team has won 60 medals so
far. How many of these have been won by short athletes?
next
In this part, you will be asked some questions.
next
QUESTIONNAIRE
Please enter the following information:
Honestly, how much did you carefully reflect upon the 6 answers you
gave to the questions just faced?
Please, answer by choosing a level of reflection in the scale below that
goes from 0 (which means “I did not reflect at all”) to 10 (which means
“I reflected the maximum possible”):
Your age
Your gender (Male, Female)
Your level of education (Secondary School/Bachelor/Master/PhD/Other)
Filed of study (Economics, Maths...)
Are you a student now? (Yes/No)
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Are you an employee now (Yes, No)
To what extent have you participated in studies like this one before?
(Nothing like this study/ Somewhat like this study/ Exactly this study)
Have you seen the questions presented before in other studies? (Yes, all
of them/ Some of them/ No, None of them)
next
THANK YOU!
Thank you for participating.
You will see your earnings on your Prolific Profile after the experimenter
has confirmed your payment.
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Conclusions
According to the Social Heuristic Hypothesis (SHH), humans internalize
as heuristic those behaviors that are successful and experienced daily.
Interactions are generally repeated, and thus cooperation may evolve
thanks to the 5 rules (Nowak, 2006). Cooperation can be internalized
and used as a default strategy in new interaction settings. Likewise, if in-
dividuals experience non-cooperation daily, they internalize selfishness
as heuristic. While through deliberation, individuals can calculate the
pay-off dominant strategy in the one-shot strategic interaction, that is
defection. Thus, SHH predicts that cooperation in one-shot anonymous
interactions is the result of an intuitive process, while deliberation leads
to defection. A series of studies successfully tested the prediction of the
SHH, but many other studies failed in the attempt to replicate the result
(see the two meta-analyses: Rand, 2019; Kvarven et al., 2020).
The main aim of this Dissertation is to reconcile the mixed evidence
and extend the current research on cooperation to explore potential mod-
erators of the effect of cognition on cooperation. In the first Part (Chap-
ters 1 and 2), we look at three potential drivers of cooperation, namely
altruism, reciprocity and social norms. While in the second Part (Chap-
ter 3), we develop a novel methodology to validate the treatments de-
signed to manipulate the modes of cognition. In Section 1 we provide
an overview of the main contributions of each Chapter, in Section 2 we
draw the concluding remarks.
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1 Chapters’ Contribution
In the first Chapter, we have explored two determinants of cooperative
behavior, altruism and reciprocity, and their dependency on the modes
of cognition. The research question that we have investigated is:
RQ1: What is the role of altruism and reciprocity in deter-
mining the level of cooperation in a Public Goods Game, and
how they moderate the effect of the cognition?
To answer this question, we ran two online studies where individuals
played a one-shot anonymous Public Goods Game (PGG). In the first
study, participants played the PGG without any cognitive manipula-
tions. We measured the disposition to be a Conditional Cooperators
as a proxy of reciprocity, beliefs about others’ contributions, and Social
Value Orientation as a proxy of altruism. The second study was identi-
cal to the first one, with the exception that participants played the PGG
under two conditions designed to foster intuition and deliberation re-
spectively: Time Pressure treatment and Motivated Delay treatment. We
have provided experimental evidence suggesting that, in the online one-
shot PGG, a higher Social Value Orientation score goes with higher con-
tribution levels, irrespective of the cognitive modes, while measures of
the disposition to be a conditional cooperator predict contribution lev-
els only under treatment designed to foster deliberation. It would be
interesting to understand why reciprocity plays such a role under delib-
eration. The disposition to cooperate may require mentalizing others’
behavior, which may involve more deliberation. Another possible expla-
nation is related to how reciprocity is measured. Indeed strategy method
may capture only the deliberative disposition to reciprocate, and it might
not be able to capture a more intuitive disposition to reciprocate. Future
work could explore these potential explanations in more details.
In the second Chapter, we have explored two determinants of cooper-
ative behavior, altruism and social norms, and their dependency on the
modes of cognition. The research question that we have investigated is:
RQ2: What is the role of altruism and social norms in de-
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termining the level of cooperation in a Public Goods Game,
and how they moderate the effect of the cognition?
To answer this question, we ran an online study where individuals
played a one-shot anonymous Public Goods Game under two conditions
designed to foster intuition and deliberation, respectively: Time Pressure
and Motivated Delay treatments. We measured descriptive and injunc-
tive norms. We have used beliefs about others’ average contribution to
the public good as a proxy for the former and the evaluations of all pos-
sible contribution levels’ social appropriateness as a proxy for the lat-
ter. We computed relative social appropriateness, a new measure of in-
junctive norm compliance, that captures the individuals’ assessment of
their own choices’ social appropriateness with respect to all other possi-
ble choices. Furthermore, we measured the Social Value Orientation. We
have provided experimental evidence that Motivated Delay significantly
increases the level of contribution and the descriptive norm. Moreover,
Motivated Delay treatment makes the injunctive norm more extreme. So-
cial Value Orientation is not affected by cognitive manipulation as in the
previous Chapter. This is consistent with the possibility that social norms
act as mediators of the effect of the cognitive manipulations on the levels
of contribution. It would be of interest to explore how Motivated Delay
increases contributions and the associated norms. It is possible that when
we ask people to write their motivation, they tend to write cooperative
motivations rather than selfish ones, affecting the associated norms.
In the previous Chapter, we found no significant difference in the
level of contributions and beliefs under the two treatments, while here
we do find a higher level of contribution and beliefs under Motivated
Delay with respect to Time Pressure. It is possible that the results are
due to the sample size. In fact, in the first Chapter we have collected
half of the participants collected in this second one and this can affect the
detectable effect size of the two studies.
Finally, in the third Chapter we have studied whether time manipu-
lations are effective in fostering reliance on intuition and deliberation by
means of Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The research question that we
have investigated is:
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RQ3: Are time manipulations effective in fostering reliance
on intuition and deliberation?
To answer this question, we ran an online study where individuals had
to answer the CRT in the long version of six items by Primi et al., 2016
(CRT-L) under three conditions: a baseline, a Time Delay condition to
foster reliance on deliberation, and a Time Pressure condition to foster
reliance on intuition. We found that the Time Delay condition increases
the likelihood to provide correct answers to the CRT-L, while the Time
Pressure condition induces more non-intuitive incorrect answers rather
than more intuitive answers. Results suggest that Time Delay increases
the disposition to deliberate, while Time Pressure seems to reduce the
reliance on deliberation. Specifically, Time Pressure increases the like-
lihood to provide non-intuitive incorrect answers rather than intuitive
answers. One possible interpretation is that Time Pressure increases the
likelihood of making a mistake rather than the likelihood of relying on
intuition. Another explanation is related to what CRT captures; it has
been argued that it is not a reliable measure of intuition (Pennycook et
al., 2016). Further research should try to clarify this issue by implement-
ing a new version of the CRT that captures the disposition of behaving
intuitively to better understand the Time Pressure manipulation’s effec-
tiveness. Moreover, it would be of great interest to explore the effect of
the other cognitive manipulations (see Table 1 in the Introduction) on the
CRT-L to test their effectiveness.
2 Concluding Remarks
A central question in the literature concerns whether cooperation is
greater when people make decisions relying on intuitive processes or
whether it requires more deliberation, but there is no agreement in the
literature. Thus in the last period, scholars have started to take into ac-
count humans’ heterogeneity by focusing on some factors that may act
as potential moderators of the effect of cognition on cooperation.
We have found that contributions to the Public Goods Game under
the two cognitive manipulations are not statistically different in Chapter
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1, while in Chapter 2 contributions under Motivated Delay are statis-
tically higher with respect to contributions under Time Pressure. Our
findings do not suggest that intuition favors cooperation, but this is not
necessarily in contrast with the SHH. Notice that we are comparing the
effect of the Motivated Delay with respect to the Time Pressure, but there
is no comparison between the two treatments with respect to a base-
line. Moreover, the results in the third Chapter suggest that the Time
Pressure treatment decreases the reliance on deliberation but it is not
clear whether it increases reliance on intuition or the likelihood to make
mistakes. A potential alternative could be that under deliberation indi-
viduals do compute the expected pay-off but they do so with respect to
some social preferences instead of selfish preferences, and this may lead
to some cooperation under deliberation.
Humans are heterogeneous, and taking into account these factors can
have different effects on the level of cooperation and exploring these fac-
tors is crucial to have a better understanding of the relationship between
the modes of cognition and human behavior. Here we have studied the
role of altruism, reciprocity, and social norms. We have found that altru-
ism accounts for contributions regardless of our cognitive manipulations
(both in Chapters 1 and 2). The disposition of being a conditional co-
operator increases the level of cooperation under Motivated Delay and
this seems to suggest that individuals are more reactive to beliefs about
others’ contributions. We have also found that Motivated Delay impacts
the associated social norms. Specifically descriptive norms are higher
under Motivated Delay as well as the injunctive norms (i.e., small contri-
butions are perceived as less socially appropriate, while large contribu-
tions as more socially appropriate). Our findings suggest that coopera-
tion is sometimes intuitive or sometimes deliberative. The actual cogni-
tive mode is more conducive to cooperation depending on the decision-
makers’ heterogeneous characteristics and their present and past social
environment.
Finally, we have looked at the effectiveness of the cognitive manip-
ulations (Chapter 3). Our results suggest that Time Delay increases re-
liance on deliberation, while Time Pressure decreases it, but it is not clear
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whether it increases reliance on intuition. In fact, Time Pressure treat-
ment increases the likelihood to provide non-intuitive incorrect answers,
but we cannot easily conclude that CRT does not induce intuition. In-
deed there is evidence that CRT does not capture intuitive predisposition
(Pennycook et al., 2016). Further research should be conducted to have
a clear view of the role of the Time Pressure treatment, because this can
bring new information on the underlying mechanism of this treatment,
and thus to have a better understanding of the experimental evidence
using such treatment to study the effect of intuition on cooperation.
In Table 25 we provide in a nutshell the Dissertation’s main findings
and further research that can be conducted.
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Table 25: Dissertation’s contributions
Chapter Research Question Findings Further Research
Chapter 1 What is the role of altruism and
reciprocity in determining the
level of cooperation in a Public
Goods Game and how they
moderate the effect of the
cognition?
Contributions to PGG are not different in the
two treatments. Altruism goes with larger
contribution levels under both treatments, while
reciprocity predicts contribution levels only
under the treatment designed to foster
deliberation
Develop a measure that
captures the disposition to
reciprocate intuitively in order
to test if the role of beliefs is
related to intuitive reciprocity
Chapter 2 What is the role of altruism and
social norms in determining the
level of cooperation in a Public
Goods Game, and how they
moderate the effect of the
cognition?
Contributions to PGG and descriptive norms
are higher under treatment designed to foster
deliberation, and injunctive norms are more
extreme under the treatment designed to foster
deliberation
Study the effect of Time Delay
compared to Motivated Delay
on cooperation and social
norms and understand the
effect of the Motivated Delay
treatment
Chapter 3 Are time manipulations
effective in fostering reliance on
intuition and deliberation?
Time Delay increases the likelihood to provide
correct answers online, while Time Pressure
increases the likelihood to provide
(non-intuitive) incorrect answers online
Develop a new measure to
capture the disposition to
behave intuitively. Test the
effectiveness of the other
cognitive manipulations by
means of the answers given to
the CRT
Note: the further lines of research illustrated in the Table are just some of the various, possible lines connected to our findings.
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riders do not free ride on punishment”. In: Nature Communications 9.1,
p. 2390.
Zonca, Joshua, Giorgio Coricelli, and Luca Polonio (2020). “Gaze patterns
disclose the link between cognitive reflection and sophistication in
strategic interaction”. In: Judgment and Decision Making 15.2, pp. 230–
245.

Unless otherwise expressly stated, all original material of whatever
nature created by Tatiana Celadin and included in this thesis, is
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial
Share Alike 3.0 Italy License.




Ask the author about other uses.
